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CONSTITUTIONAL MYOPIA: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S BLINDNESS TO RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY AND RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 
VALUES IN TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY 
 Alan Brownstein∗ 
          It is difficult to analyze a Supreme Court decision that is as 
fundamentally misguided and unpersuasive as last term’s decision in 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, the case upholding state-sponsored 
prayers before Town Board Meetings. In attempting to do so in this 
Article, I critically evaluate the Court’s repeated failures to adequately 
address the serious religious equality and religious liberty issues 
presented in this case. With regard to religious equality concerns, for 
example, the Court all but completely ignores the Town’s 
discrimination in favor of established organized churches and against 
minorities with too few adherents to organize a congregation in the 
Town, nonaffiliated spiritual residents of the community, and 
nonreligious residents. Even worse, the Court suggests that allowing 
low level functionaries to develop informal and imprecise criteria to 
determine who should be invited to offer prayers at board meetings 
without adopting a policy or providing any guidance on how these 
decisions should be reached somehow immunizes the Town from 
serious constitutional scrutiny. Instead, I argue that this lack of 
guidelines and policy itself should be understood to violate the First 
Amendment because it so obviously increases the risk of biased and 
discriminatory conduct. 
          The Court’s discussion of plaintiffs’ religious liberty concerns is 
even more untenable. Plaintiffs argued that if a government official or 
deliberative body has the discretionary authority to make decisions that 
will seriously impact the needs and interests of individuals or small 
groups of citizens, it is intrinsically coercive for those officials to ask 
these citizens to engage in a religious exercise such as a prayer before 
they submit their arguments or petitions to government decision-
makers. In order to reject these claims, Justice Kennedy describes an 
∗ Professor of Law emeritus, University of California, Davis. B.A. Antioch College, 1969;
J.D., Harvard University, 1977. I wish to acknowledge the help I received from my research
assistant, Chris Ronne and from Peg Durkin and other library staff at the UC Davis School of
Law.
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understanding of social reality that is difficult to believe and impossible 
to share. Perhaps most egregiously, Kennedy’s analysis treats prayer 
as if it is some kind of abstract ceremonial activity instead of what it is 
for most Americans—a personal, meaningful communication between 
the individual and G-D.  
          The Article concludes with a discussion of the possible 
implications of this decision for the constitutional protection of 
religious liberty and equality in other contexts and circumstances. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Town of Greece is a modest, residential suburb bordering 
the City of Rochester, in upstate New York, with a population of 
roughly 94,000 residents.1 An elected Board governs the Town.2 
Pursuant to its official duties, the Town Board holds monthly 
meetings where its members, and other Town officials, sit on a dais 
in front of an audience of residents.3 Attendance is modest. Typically 
no more than ten residents are present during Board meetings.4 
The Town Board engages in various ceremonial, legislative and 
administrative (quasi adjudicatory) functions at these meetings.5 
These monthly public sessions are designed to be participatory and 
residents are given numerous opportunities to address the Board and 
to try to influence its’ decisions.6 In many instances, residents at 
meetings directly petition their government during public hearings.7 
Traditionally, the Board’s meetings opened with a moment of 
silence. In 1999, however, the Board changed its practice and began 
to open its meetings with a prayer offered by a volunteer guest 
“chaplain” invited to the meeting for that purpose.8 The process by 
which the Town invited individuals to offer prayers at meetings was 
informal and imprecise.9 No actual invitation policy was ever 
adopted.10 
The Town is predominantly Christian, but not all of its residents 
share the same faith.11 To schedule a chaplain at an upcoming Board 
meeting, town employees directly invited clergy from religious 
congregations listed in a local newspaper and a Community Guide 
published by the local Chamber of Commerce.12 Eventually, 
employees compiled a list of clergy who had accepted the invitations 
1. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 22 (2d. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014). 
2. Id.
3. Brief for Respondents at 2, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No.
12-696).
4. Id.; Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1846 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1847.
7. See id.
8. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
9. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1831 (Alito, J., concurring).
10. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
11. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23–24.
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to offer prayers in the past and other available prayer-givers.13 
Although a Buddhist Temple was located in the Town, and several 
Jewish synagogues were located nearby but outside the Town’s 
border, the list contained only Christian-affiliated organizations 
within the Town’s boundaries.14 
From the commencement of the Town’s prayer practice until 
plaintiffs’ counsel challenged this activity, Christian clergy delivered 
every prayer offered at a Town Board meeting.15 Although the Town 
asserted that any resident could request to give the invocation, no 
such policy was every written down, much less formally adopted. 
The Town took no steps whatsoever to publicize this opportunity to 
its residents.16 
In response to prodding by plaintiffs’ counsel, the Town invited 
four non-Christian individuals to offer prayers at meetings in 2008. 
Two prayers were delivered by a Jewish layman who happened to be 
a Board member’s acquaintance, one was offered by a Wiccan 
Priestess who asked to be allowed to give the prayer, and the fourth 
was presented by the chairman of the local Baha’i Temple, but only 
after plaintiffs filed suit.17 These were the only non-Christians to 
offer the state-sponsored prayer at some 130 Town Board meetings 
between 1999 and 2010.18 
During this period, approximately two-thirds of the prayers 
offered made some reference to “‘Jesus,’ ‘Jesus Christ,’ ‘Your Son,’ 
or the ‘Holy Spirit.’”19 Many prayers included more extensive 
Christian references and themes.20 Plaintiffs cited one prayer that 
stated, 
We look with anticipation to the celebration of Holy Week 
and Easter. It is in the solemn events of next week that we 
find the very heart and center of our Christian faith. We 
acknowledge the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the 
cross. We draw strength, vitality, and confidence from his 
resurrection at Easter. Jesus Christ, who took away the sins 
13. Id.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id.
17. Id.; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 13–15.
18. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
19. Id. at 24; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 9.
20. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 24–25; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 8–12.
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of the world, destroyed our death, through his dying and in 
his rising, he has restored our life. Blessed are you, who has 
raised up the Lord Jesus, you will raise us, in our turn, and 
put us by His side.21 
Another prayer “disparaged those who question[ed] the Town’s 
prayer practice, or who are not ‘Godfearing.’”22 Yet another 
prayer disparagingly characterized those who challenged the 
Town’s prayer practice as an “ignorant” “minority.”23 
In offering the prayer, the invited chaplain stood in front of the 
Board at a podium bearing the Town seal and faced the citizens in 
attendance.24 Some chaplains asked the citizens to stand and “bow 
[their] heads out of respect to God.”25 Board members, too, made 
such requests and routinely stood, bowed their heads, and made the 
sign of the cross.26 The chaplains typically offered their prayers on 
behalf of the audience and the community, not on their own personal 
behalf.27 No town official or Board member reviewed the prayers or 
offered chaplains any guidance as to their content.28 
A. The Second Circuit Opinion
Plaintiffs Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, a Jew and an 
Atheist, challenged the Town’s practice, alleging that it violated the 
Establishment Clause by having “the effect, even if not the purpose, 
of establishing religion.”29 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in plaintiffs’ favor. Judge Calabresi, writing for a unanimous 
panel, distinguished the Town’s prayer practice from the prayers 
offered before state legislatures, which the Supreme Court had 
upheld in Marsh v. Chambers.30 The prayers in Marsh were 
non-sectarian,31 and the state legislature’s prayer practice, taken as a 
whole, did not have “‘the effect of affiliating the government with 
21. Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 9–10.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 8–9.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id.
27. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 24, 32 (2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014). 
28. See id. at 23.
29. Id. at 26.
30. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
31. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 27 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
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any one specific faith or belief.’”32 The prayer practices of the Town 
of Greece were decidedly different. 
Judge Calabresi did not identify any specific aspect of the 
Town’s practice that violated the Establishment Clause in and of 
itself.33 Instead, he evaluated multiple factors that, taken together, 
demonstrated that the Town had impermissibly aligned itself with the 
Christian faith.34 The Town’s actions as well as its inactions 
contributed to the court’s conclusion.35 
The court found that “the Town’s process for selecting 
prayer-givers virtually ensured a Christian viewpoint” would be 
expressed.36 The Town ignored both congregations outside its 
borders (even if they were attended by town residents) and 
nonaffiliated residents that did not choose to join an organized 
religion.37 Further, it made no attempt to inform the community that 
it would allow residents from any faith or no faith who requested the 
opportunity to deliver an invocation.38 
The delivery of the prayers was also problematic. Guest 
chaplains “appeared to speak on behalf of the town and its residents, 
rather than only on behalf of themselves” by using terms like “we” or 
“our” rather than using singular language such as “I” pray.39 It was 
also common for prayer-givers to encourage residents to participate 
in the prayer through physical movements such as standing or 
bowing one’s head.40 While permitting these practices, the Board did 
nothing to dispel the almost unavoidable impression that the Town 
endorsed Christian beliefs.41 In sum although the court “ascribe[d] no 
religious animus” to the Board or other Town officials, the court 
concluded that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated the 
Town’s affiliation with one religion, Christianity.42 
32. Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989)). 
33. See id. at 30.
34. See id. at 22, 30.
35. See id. at 30.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 31.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 32.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 32. Plaintiffs abandoned their claim that the Town intentionally discriminated
against non-Christians in selecting guest chaplains. See id. at 26. 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINIONS43
A. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for the Court, 
except for the section responding to plaintiffs’ coercion and religious 
liberty claims. As to those issues, Justice Thomas wrote a separate 
opinion with which Justice Scalia joined. Justice Alito added a 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Kagan wrote a 
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor, and Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion collapsed the numerous problems 
with the Town’s prayer practices identified by plaintiffs and the 
Second Circuit into two questions: (1) whether the Establishment 
Clause requires that state-sponsored prayers offered at the beginning 
of town board meetings must be nonsectarian in their content;44 and 
(2) whether the prayer practices adopted by the Town of Greece
impermissibly coerced residents into participating in a religious
exercise.45 The Court majority emphatically answered “No” to both
questions.
With regard to the first question, Justice Kennedy’s analysis is 
grounded in history and tradition. Kennedy argues that the offering 
of sectarian prayers before Congress and state legislative sessions 
was accepted by the Framers and the American people at the time of 
the Constitution’s adoption and has “withstood the scrutiny of time 
and political change.”46 The Court’s opinion in Marsh upheld the 
constitutionality of such prayers.47 Any attempt to interpret Marsh to 
permit only generic or ecumenical prayers was mistaken.48 Courts 
and government officials lack the ability to distinguish impermissibly 
sectarian from permissibly generic prayers.49 All prayers are 
sectarian to some extent in that they may be challenged as conflicting 
43. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
44. See id. at 1820–23.
45. See id. at 1824–28.
46. Id. at 1819 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)). Justice Kennedy did acknowledge, however, that there was 
no information in the record indicating how prevalent it was to begin local government meetings 
with prayers either historically or in current times. See id.  
47. See id. at 1818–20.
48. See id. at 1820–22.
49. See id. at 1822.
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with some person’s beliefs.50 Further, government lacks the authority 
to restrict clergy to offering only non-sectarian state-sponsored 
prayers.51 Once an individual is invited to offer a prayer at a state 
function, the government is prohibited from requiring that the 
content of the prayer must be generic or ecumenical.52 
Justice Kennedy did concede that the historical tradition of 
legislative prayer upheld in Marsh had some substantive limits. The 
purpose of the legislative prayer was ceremonial—to solemnize the 
legislative deliberations and inspire legislators to work together for 
the common good.53 Prayers that disparaged non-adherents or 
attempted to proselytize or preach conversion exceeded the 
permissible scope of these invocations.54 Even where individual 
prayers ignored these constraints, however, the Constitution would 
not be violated. There must be a pattern of disparaging or 
proselytizing prayers over time to support a viable Establishment 
Clause claim.55 No such pattern had been demonstrated by plaintiffs 
in this case. 
Justice Kennedy also found no fault with the Town’s “informal” 
process of inviting clergy from local congregations to offer prayers.56 
The Town was not required to solicit clergy from congregations 
outside its borders.57 Further, any failings of this invitation process 
were effectively cured by the Town’s contention that it would have 
allowed any resident to offer a prayer at the Board meeting who 
requested the opportunity to do so.58 It did not seem to matter to 
Justice Kennedy that this unwritten policy had neither been formally 
adopted nor publicized. 
As to the second question, plaintiffs argued their coercion claim 
more rigorously before the Supreme Court than they had below. 
Unlike citizens sitting in the gallery of Congress or a state 
legislature, they argued, residents attending town board meetings are 
not passive observers. They are active participants in government 
50. See id. at 1822–23.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1823–24.
54. See id. at 1824.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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who attend meetings for the purpose of speaking to the Board and 
influencing its decisions.59 As such, residents would naturally want 
to avoid alienating the decision-makers they would soon be 
petitioning. 
The setting and nature of the Town’s prayer practice magnified 
coercion concerns. The guest chaplains faced the residents in the 
audience, not the Board. The prayer was directed at audience 
members who were often asked to stand, bow their heads, or join in 
the prayer.60 Commonly, the chaplain claimed to speak in the name 
of those who were present. Thus, the prayer was not the chaplain’s 
prayer alone. It purported to be the prayer of everyone in the room.61 
Typically, there were only a few residents in attendance at meetings. 
Accordingly, there was no anonymity in this setting. It was 
impossible to refuse to stand or to leave during the prayer without 
being noticed.62 
In these circumstances, plaintiffs argued, state-sponsored prayer 
is intrinsically coercive. Confronted with requests to participate in a 
prayer that is joined in by Board members and the majority of 
residents in the audience, dissenting residents would feel 
considerable pressure to comply. They would reasonably fear that the 
failure to do so would offend one or more Board members, the very 
decision-makers they were trying to influence.63 
Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish the setting of town board 
meetings from Congress or state legislative sessions fell on deaf ears. 
Justice Kennedy concluded that their coercion claims were precluded 
both by historical tradition and the precedent of Marsh.64 
Significantly, he determined that the “principal audience” for the 
prayers was the Board members themselves, not residents in the 
audience.65 Further, the invitations to participate were made by 
prayer-givers, not by Board members.66 From Justice Kennedy’s 
perspective, audience members should understand the American 
59. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22.
60. See id. at 23.
61. See id. at 29.
62. See id. at 24.
63. See id. at 23–30.
64. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825–26 (2014).
65. See id. at 1826.
66. See id.
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tradition of legislative prayer and appreciate the benign, ceremonial 
nature of this activity.67 
Justice Kennedy also challenged plaintiffs’ arguments that there 
was anything intrinsically coercive about the Town of Greece’s 
prayer practice. The Board never suggested to residents that their 
failure to participate in the guest chaplain’s prayers would be held 
against them or would influence the Board’s decision.68 No evidence 
in the record demonstrated that the Board had rejected the petitions 
or arguments of dissenters in the past.69 Also, Justice Kennedy 
explained, anyone who objected to a prayer was free to leave the 
room while it was being offered. No one would notice them doing so 
or consider their conduct to be disrespectful.70 If residents did stand 
for a prayer they could not in good conscience join, no one would 
think that standing signaled any agreement with what was being 
said.71 Adult residents of the Town would simply be acknowledging 
a long-standing, religiously-neutral, American tradition.72  
B. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a concurring 
opinion for the purpose of addressing Justice Kagan’s dissent. Justice 
Alito defended the unguided and careless process the Town 
employed in inviting guest chaplains, which resulted in only 
Christian clergy being asked to offer prayers, as a series of minor 
errors that did not reach the level of constitutional significance.73 Not 
much more could be reasonably expected from small towns without 
imposing unacceptably heavy burdens on local governments.74 
Justice Alito also doubted that the Town of Greece’s prayer practices 
at Board meetings were strikingly different than the practices of 
many other towns and cities throughout the country.75 Those 
practices may well be imperfect, but their failings do not require 
67. See id. at 1825.
68. See id. at 1826.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1827.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1827–28.
73. See id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring). For example, Justice Alito apparently believed
the Town should have included clergy from neighboring synagogues on its invitation list, but its 
failure to do so was innocent error. Id. 
74. See id. at 1831.
75. See id. at 1831–32.
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judicial intervention. Certainly, the case did not justify what Justice 
Alito deemed to be Justice Kagan’s overwrought dissent.76 
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, 
reiterated his longstanding position that the Establishment Clause is 
not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and does not bind 
state or local governments. Accordingly, it is not applicable in this 
case.77 Even if the Establishment Clause did apply to state and local 
governments, however, Justice Thomas argued the Town of Greece’s 
prayer practices would not violate the Constitution. The only 
coercion practices that warranted concern historically were those 
“support[ed] by force of law and threat of penalty.”78 Plaintiffs did 
not allege that they were subjected to any such formal sanctions. 
D. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer’s dissent echoed the totality of the circumstances 
analysis employed by the Second Circuit and focused on many of the 
same factors identified in Judge Calabresi’s opinion. In particular, he 
emphasized the ease with which the Town could have mitigated 
many of these concerns. To expand and diversify the pool of 
individuals invited to offer prayers at Board meetings, for example, 
the Town could have posted a notice of its willingness to allow any 
resident to offer the invocation on its website, announced this 
inclusive policy at the beginning of meetings, and informed 
congregations located just outside the Town’s borders that they 
would be welcome to participate as well.79 Instead, Justice Breyer 
noted, “the town chose to do nothing.”80 
E. Justice Kagan’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kagan authored the primary dissent. To Justice Kagan, 
the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violated core constitutional 
equality principles. As a general matter, the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the state from “align[ing] itself with, and plac[ing] its 
76. See id. at 1834.
77. See id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 1837–38.
79. See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
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imprimatur on, a particular religious creed.”81 Moreover, failures to 
abide by this requirement are magnified when individuals are 
interacting with and participating in “the institutions and process of 
government,” as was true in this case.82 When an individual is asked 
to pray by a government official or a member of the clergy invited by 
a government official when she is seeking benefits or services or 
seeking to influence government decision-makers, religious 
minorities must either subordinate their beliefs or publicly set 
themselves apart from the majority on religious grounds. The prayer 
becomes “an instrument for dividing her from adherents to the 
community’s majority religion, and for altering the very nature of her 
relationship with her government.”83 
Justice Kagan offered several hypotheticals in which she argued 
the above principles would clearly apply to constrain the offering of 
state-sponsored prayers. For example, it would violate the 
Establishment Clause if immediately prior to trial, the presiding 
judge asked a minister to come forward who then asked the attorneys 
and litigants to rise and join him in prayer.84 Why should not a 
similar analysis and conclusion apply in the Town of Greece case? 
The answer, Justice Kagan suggests, is that the five Justice majority 
of the Court believes that this case should be treated differently, and 
the Town’s prayer practices upheld, because the tradition of 
legislative prayer described and upheld in Marsh requires that 
result.85 
Justice Kagan emphatically rejected this conclusion. The nature 
and process of prayers offered at small town board meetings are so 
substantively different than the prayer practice at state legislative 
session upheld in Marsh, she argued, that a different analysis applies 
that must lead to a different result. Town of Greece is distinct from 
Marsh in three critical ways.86 First, members of the public attending 
state legislative sessions or sitting in the gallery of Congress are 
passive spectators.87 They have no role in the proceedings.88 
81. Id. at 1843 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1844.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1842.
85. See id. at 1845.
86. See id. at 1847–48.
87. Id. at 1847.
88. Id.
Winter 2014] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 385 
Residents attending small town board meetings are there to influence 
decision-makers on matters that are important to them.89 “Each and 
every aspect of those sessions provides opportunities for Town 
residents to interact with public officials. And the most important 
parts enable those citizens to petition their government.”90 
Second, the prayers upheld in Marsh were directed exclusively 
at elected representatives. The prayer practice was an internal 
procedure.91 The prayers were delivered to and for the benefit of the 
legislature. They were not directed at the gallery or the public at 
large.92 In Town of Greece, the intended audience was the residents 
gathered for the Board meeting.93 The chaplain stood with his back 
to the Town Board, faced the audience, and often asked the audience 
to stand, bow their heads and join him in prayer. Even the Court 
majority conceded that in asking the audience to “[l]et us all pray 
together,” the guest chaplain treated the residents attending the 
meeting as if they were part of his congregation.94 
Finally, Justice Kagan observed that prayers offered to the 
Nebraska legislature in Marsh and the prayers offered at Town of 
Greece Board meetings “differ[ed] in their content and character.”95 
After complaint from a Jewish lawmaker, the chaplain removed all 
references to Christian doctrine from the prayers he offered to the 
Nebraska legislature.96 In contrast, Justice Kagan noted, “[N]o one 
can fairly read the prayers from Greece’s Town meetings as anything 
other than explicitly Christian—constantly and exclusively so.”97 
Because the Town of Greece’s prayer practice was not governed 
by the Court’s holding in Marsh or the historical tradition on which it 
is based, it must be evaluated on its merits and cannot survive basic 
Establishment Clause scrutiny. This does not mean that the 
Constitution prohibits state-sponsored prayers at small town board 
meetings, however. The Town Board could have taken various steps 
to avoid running afoul of constitutional requirements. It could have 
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1847–48.
93. See id. at 1848.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. Id.
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explained to guest chaplains that the Board expected them to offer 
nonsectarian prayers that were respectful of religious diversity in the 
community. Alternatively, the Town could have invited clergy of 
many different faiths to serve as guest chaplains.98 What the Town is 
prohibited from doing is arranging for the offering of state-sponsored 
prayers in a way that virtually guarantees the alignment of 
government with a particular faith. 
III. RELIGIOUS EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
The state-sponsored prayer practices the Town of Greece 
engaged in substantially burdened religious equality in two distinct, 
albeit overlapping, ways. First, the Town discriminated in favor of 
established religious congregations and against three groups of 
residents: religious minorities with too few adherents to organize a 
congregation in the Town; nonaffiliated, spiritual individuals who as 
a matter of religious choice decline to join any of the organized 
congregations in the community; and non-religious residents.99 Only 
clergy from recognized congregations within the Town’s borders 
were invited to serve as guest chaplains and offer prayers at the 
beginning of Town Board meetings.100 Second, the Town 
discriminated in favor of Christianity and against other faiths and 
secular belief systems. Over more than a ten-year period, every 
prayer-giver at Town Board meetings was a member of the Christian 
clergy, except for four exceptions during one year in which 
complaints about the Town’s practices were expressed.101  
A. Discrimination in Favor of Established Congregations
The first discriminatory practice was blatant and undisputed. 
The Town invited clergy from organized congregations within its 
boundaries. No one else was even considered as a possible prayer-
giver.102 While Justice Alito recognizes that religious minorities 
98. Id. at 1849.
99. As Judge Calabresi explained, “The town fails to recognize that its residents may hold
religious beliefs that are not represented by a place of worship within the town. Such residents 
may be members of congregations in nearby towns or, indeed, may not be affiliated with any 
congregation. The town is not a community of religious institutions, but of individual residents, 
and, at the least, it must serve those residents without favor or disfavor to any creed or belief.” 
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 31 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
100. Id. at 23, 31.
101. See id.
102. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816; id. at 1828 (Alito, J., concurring).
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living in the Town of Greece may worship in houses of worship in 
adjoining communities,103 he and the rest of the majority on the 
Court are as oblivious to the existence of non-affiliated, spiritual 
residents and the need to recognize them in a prayer policy as the 
political leaders of the Town of Greece.104 
Given the facially discriminatory nature of this practice, there 
can be only two possible doctrinal arguments to support the Town’s 
selection process. It may be argued that the level of discrimination in 
this case does not warrant constitutional attention. Alternatively, it 
may be that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit 
discrimination between the classes treated differently by the Town’s 
prayer practices. The Court appears to support the first argument. It 
ignores the second argument entirely. 
The Court states repeatedly that the Town of Greece’s practice 
was not discriminatory because no one who requested to be 
considered as a prayer giver was ever turned down.105 It is also true 
however that the Town did absolutely nothing to publicize the fact 
that it would be willing to accept requests by residents unaffiliated 
with a local congregation to serve as guest chaplains at Town Board 
meetings.106 The question of discrimination here is straight-forward. 
There are two classes in the Town. One class is comprised of clergy 
from organized congregations within the Town’s borders. The other 
class is comprised of religious minorities who lack the numbers to 
sustain an organized congregation in the Town; nonaffiliated, 
spiritual residents of the community; and non-religious residents. 
The first class is invited to serve as prayer-givers at Town Board 
103. See id. at 1828 (Alito, J., concurring).
104. “The number of Americans who do not identify with any religion continues to grow at a
rapid pace. One-fifth of the U.S. public—and a third of adults under 30—are religiously 
unaffiliated today, the highest percentages ever in Pew Research Center polling.” “Nones” on the 
Rise, PEW RESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org 
/2012/10.09/nones-on-the-rise/. 
105. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816; id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
106. See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]n a context where religious minorities exist
and where more could easily have been done to include their participation, the town chose to do 
nothing. It could, for example, have posted its policy of permitting anyone to give an invocation 
on its website . . . which provides dates and times of upcoming town board meetings along with 
minutes of prior meetings. It could have announced inclusive policies at the beginning of its 
board meetings, just before introducing the month’s prayer giver. It could have provided 
information to those houses of worship of all faiths that lie just outside its borders and include 
citizens of Greece among their members. Given that the town could easily have made these or 
similar efforts but chose not to, the fact that all of the prayers (aside from the 2008 outliers) were 
given by adherents of a single religion reflects a lack of effort to include others.”). 
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meetings. Members of the second class are not notified that their 
requests to serve as prayer-givers would be considered, much less 
accepted. There is, however, an unwritten, unpublicized policy 
indicating if they should make such a request, the Town would 
accept their request in some fashion. Does this differing treatment 
count as discrimination for constitutional purposes?107 
I know of no cases on point, but common sense intuitions 
strongly suggest that the different treatment of these two classes 
constitutes constitutionally cognizable discrimination. Suppose, for 
example, the Town of Greece invited white clergy to offer prayers at 
town board meetings, but followed an unpublicized policy that the 
town would accept the requests of African-American clergy to be 
guest chaplains, if any such requests were communicated to it. Does 
anyone doubt that this policy constitutes race discrimination? If a 
government policy invites Christians to participate in an opportunity, 
but requires Jews, Moslems, and members of other minority faiths to 
come forward and ask to be included, without providing any notice 
that such requests would be honored, would not that policy constitute 
religious discrimination on its face? Having one process for the 
majority, whether it is whites or Christians, and another process for 
minorities surely constitutes discrimination—particularly when the 
process for minorities is never publicly disclosed. 
Thus, the Court’s repeatedly proclaiming that the Town’s prayer 
practice was non-discriminatory seems to be clearly mistaken.108 
Perhaps, however, what the Court is actually arguing on this issue is 
not that the Town’s practice is free from discrimination but rather 
that discrimination in favor of organized congregations and against 
less organized religious minorities, the non-affiliated, and non-
religious residents is constitutionally permissible. The Court may 
107. It is important to emphasize that the discrimination at issue here is not geographical. It is
discrimination between religious groups organized into congregations and institutions and 
religious groups and spiritual individuals that because of their limited numbers or minority beliefs 
are not represented by a religious organization in the Town of Greece. No one disputes that 
unrepresented religious minorities and non-affiliated individuals live in the Town. The 
discrimination question is whether these residents can be treated less favorably than religious 
residents who are members of organized congregations.  
108. Indeed, the Court’s language seems particularly odd since it insists that the town “would
welcome” religious minorities, the nonaffiliated and non-religious residents, as guest chaplains. 
See id. at 1824 (majority opinion). Who feels “welcome” to an event to which other people are 
invited while you are admitted only after asking to be allowed in?  
Winter 2014] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 389 
think, although it does not say this explicitly, that treating these 
classes differently does not violate the Establishment Clause. 
Here, however, we do have a case on point and it fairly 
explicitly holds that discrimination between these two classes does 
violate the Establishment Clause. In Larson v. Valente,109 the Court 
held that, “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is 
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”110 The “denominational preferences” that the Court struck 
down in Larson was not a law that facially discriminated against 
Jews, Catholics, or some other named faith. It was a law that treated 
religious organizations receiving less than 50 percent of their funding 
from their members less favorably than religious organizations 
receiving more than 50 percent of their funding from their 
members.111 Specifically, the Court held that the challenged law 
makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between different 
religious organizations. We agree with the Court of 
Appeals’ observation that the provision effectively 
distinguishes between ‘well-established churches’ that have 
‘achieved strong but not total financial support from their 
members,’ on the one hand, and ‘churches which are new 
and lacking in a constituency, or which, as a matter of 
policy, may favor public solicitation over general reliance 
on financial support from members,’ on the other hand.112 
It is difficult to see why the Town of Greece’s policy should not 
be similarly construed to constitute prohibited discrimination 
between “well-established churches” and “churches which are new 
and lacking in a constituency,” or discrimination between 
well-established churches and minority religions with too few 
adherents to form a congregation within the Town’s borders.113 
109. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
110. Id. at 244.
111. See id. at 231–32.
112. Id. at 246 n.23 (quoting Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 456
U.S. 228 (1982)). 
113. A non-discriminatory policy, consistent with constitutional guarantees, would not require
equality of effect. The various non-discriminatory invitation arrangements described by Justice 
Breyer, see Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting), would almost certainly 
result in more members of majority faiths offering prayers than members of minority faiths. If too 
many individuals volunteered to offer prayers, the Town would have to prioritize its invitations 
based on neutral criteria that did not involve the number, or organizational structure, of adherents 
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B. Favoring Christian Denominations and Beliefs
The argument that the Town of Greece’s prayer practice 
unconstitutionally favored Christianity raises more difficult 
questions. Other than four exceptions during one year, for over a 
decade only Christian clergy were invited to offer prayers before 
Town Board meetings.114 However, plaintiffs abandoned their 
argument that the failure to invite non-Christian guest chaplains 
involved intentional discrimination,115 and the lower court did not 
find that the Town’s decisions were based on “religious animus.”116 
It seems clear that the Town of Greece is a predominantly Christian 
community.117 This does not suggest that its population is 
exclusively Christian. There are allusions in the record to a Buddhist 
temple in the Town.118 A leader of a “local Baha’i temple” was one 
of the four non-Christians invited to offer prayers on one occasion.119 
There are Jewish residents of the Town who worship at synagogues 
“not far away” in the adjoining city of Rochester.120 Plaintiffs’ 
argument in essence, which was accepted in substantial respects by 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and Justices Breyer’s and 
Kagan’s dissent, was that the process by which the Town of Greece 
selected clergy and the sectarian content of many of the prayers 
offered during Town Board meetings demonstrated that the Town 
aligned itself with the Christian faith.121 Non-Christians were treated 
as if they did not exist or were unworthy of notice. Neither their 
identity nor their beliefs were taken into account by the Town’s 
prayer practices. The fact that a town is predominantly of one faith 
does not justify government conduct that suggests that this is the 
only faith or system of beliefs that matters. 
The Court’s response to this argument is varied. Justice 
Kennedy argued that the Town need not seek guest chaplains from 
in the community, but that would still in all likelihood result in a predominant number of guest 
chaplains from larger faiths. 
114. See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.
115. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014). 
116. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring); Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32.
117. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 24.
119. See id. at 23; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 13–15.
120. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1828 (Alito, J., concurring).
121. See id. at 1838–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 1851 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondents, supra note 3, at 15, 21–23. 
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houses of worship outside its borders in order to create a more 
diversified pool of prayer-givers.122 Justice Alito disagreed. His 
concurrence indicates that that the failure to include synagogues 
from neighboring communities would be unacceptable if their 
exclusion was a matter of deliberate policy.123 The Town’s failure to 
include the adjoining synagogues and the Buddhist temple in this 
case did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was a result 
of an informal, imprecise process involving petty functionaries who 
were provided insufficient guidance by the Board. This admittedly 
sloppy process was a far cry from invidious discrimination.124 Both 
Justices seem to think that in light of the predominantly Christian 
population of the community, the failure to invite non-Christian 
clergy as guest chaplains or to include any message in the prayer 
program acknowledging non-Christian residents or their beliefs was 
basically no big deal.125 
The Court’s analysis is seriously problematic for several 
reasons, both in terms of doctrine and the practical consequences of 
its decision. As a practical matter, Justice Kennedy’s contention that 
a town can simply ignore the fact that minority residents worship at 
houses of worship in adjoining communities is a virtual recipe for 
religious discrimination. Outside of large cities it is commonplace for 
religious minorities who live in several small towns in an area to 
establish a congregation and house of worship in one town to serve 
the spiritual needs of the residents of several communities.126 Under 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, no town in the area other than the one in 
which the house of worship is located has any obligation to invite 
religious minority residents to participate in the state-sponsored 
prayers offered at town meetings. I am at a loss to identify any virtue 
in such an approach that is so unnecessarily insensitive to the needs 
of religious minorities who do not live in metropolitan areas. 
122. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
123. See id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1824 (majority opinion), 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
126. Alan Brownstein, Town of Greece v. Galloway: Constitutional Challenges to State-
Sponsored Prayers at Local Government Meetings, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1521, 1532 (2014) 
[hereinafter Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers].  
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1. The Unconstitutionality of Vesting Decisions About Religion
in the Unguided Discretion of Petty Officials
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court’s apparent conclusion
that the lack of guidelines provided to lower level functionaries in 
inviting guest chaplains and the informal, imprecise nature of the 
selection process somehow mitigates constitutional concerns or 
immunizes decisions from meaningful constitutional review is 
nothing short of extraordinary. When other rights are at issue and 
decisions are being made with constitutionally-salient values at 
stake, the courts have emphatically demanded that government 
operate under carefully structured and transparent guidelines to limit 
the risk of biased decision-making. Leaving decisions to 
inadequately guided petty functionaries has always been considered a 
constitutional violation, not a shield for discriminatory results. 
In freedom of speech cases, for example, the courts’ willingness 
to strike down vague and overbroad laws reflects in part the concern 
that imprecise and indeterminate standards in regulations that may 
apply to speech risk and invite “discriminatory enforcement.”127 
Plaintiffs need not prove that discrimination actually occurred to 
support a constitutional challenge in these cases.128 It is sufficient to 
demonstrate that government officials were given the “unbridled 
discretion” to determine whether specific speech warranted sanction. 
Thus, in City of Houston v. Hill,129 for example, the city argued 
unsuccessfully that its ordinance “mak[ing] it unlawful to interrupt a 
police officer in the performance of his or her duties”130 did not 
violate the First Amendment because there was “no evidence that the 
city has applied the ordinance to chill particular speakers or 
ideas.”131 Despite the lack of evidence of actual discrimination, the 
Court struck down the ordinance because of the unguided discretion 
it conferred on the police officers who enforced it.132 
127. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 71–72 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting that vague and overbroad laws are constitutionally problematic 
because they chill protected speech and create a “risk of discriminatory enforcement”). 
128. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615–16 (1971) (reversing convictions of
ordinance prohibiting conduct on public sidewalks annoying to persons passing by without the 
Court knowing details of defendants’ conduct because vague and overbroad ordinance is “an 
obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement”). 
129. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
130. Id. at 453.
131. Id. at 459.
132. See id. at 466–67.
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The same concerns about the dangers of unguided discretion and 
the risk of bias should apply when religion rather than speech is at 
issue. Judge Posner in reviewing a RLUIPA case involving a 
statutory challenge to the denial of a church’s rezoning petition noted 
“the vulnerability of religious institutions—especially those that are 
not affiliated with the mainstream Protestant sects or the Roman 
Catholic Church—to subtle forms of discrimination when, as in the 
case of the grant or denial of zoning variances, a state delegates 
essentially standardless discretion to nonprofessionals operating 
without procedural safeguards.”133 A similar concern should apply in 
Town of Greece. Put simply, we do not trust the government when it 
operates without standards in regulating speech or choosing among 
religious faiths. 
The Court has also made it clear that the operation of any 
licensing or permit system imposed on expressive activities cannot 
be left to the discretion of a government official or functionary. 
Instead, the government must “establish neutral criteria to insure that 
the licensing decision is not based on the content or viewpoint of the 
speech being considered.”134 These standards are not only a critical 
tool for preventing discriminatory decisions because they directly 
limit official discretion. They are also essential to meaningful 
judicial review of alleged official censorship of unpopular ideas. As 
the Court in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.135 
explained, 
[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to
distinguish, “as applied,” between a licensor’s legitimate
denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial
power. Standards provide the guideposts that check the
licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine
whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored
speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations
by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for
courts to determine in any particular case whether the
133. Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d
895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005). 
134. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988).
135. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing 
unfavorable, expression.136 
Justices Kennedy and Alito characterize the Town of Greece’s 
process for inviting guest chaplains as imprecise and informal. A 
more accurate description would note that the Town never adopted a 
policy for inviting clergy prior to the commencement of this 
litigation and left the invitation decisions to employees who, over 
time, “developed a more or less standard procedure.”137 There were 
no guidelines provided to the low level functionaries charged with 
inviting prayer-givers. These town employees exercised their own 
discretion in compiling a list of potential guest chaplains and in 
determining which clergy on the list to invite. The Town never 
adopted the kind of neutral criteria necessary to avoid biased 
decisions. Further, given the ad hoc nature of the invitation process, 
it is hardly surprising that plaintiffs could not prove intentional 
discrimination, notwithstanding the continuing invitation of 
exclusively Christian clergy for over a decade.138 Juxtaposing the 
unguided discretion and lack of formal guidelines in this case with 
the standards required in free speech cases makes the Court’s 
apparent acquiescence to the Town of Greece’s invitation process 
hard to justify and accept.139 
136. Id. at 758.
137. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014). 
138. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1852 n.5 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (wondering how Town Board members could fail to notice that the sectarian prayers 
offered included only Christian content and were delivered exclusively by Christian clergy). 
139. Justice Alito expressed his concerns about small towns, such as the Town of Greece,
being held to ambiguous and uncertain constitutional standards, implying that they should be 
given some leeway in their struggles to do the right thing when dealing with the intersection of 
church and state. See id. at 1831–32 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito is certainly correct that 
the Establishment Clause case law in this area has hardly been a model of clarity. See id. at 1831; 
Brownstein, State-sponsored Prayer, supra note 126, at 1523–28. But, Justice Alito has 
demonstrated no such concern about local government officials or employees dealing with 
ambiguous and indeterminate standards when other constitutional guarantees are at issue. It 
would be hard to identify an area of constitutional law where the standards are more opaque and 
difficult to apply than the free speech rights of public school students. See, e.g., B.H. ex rel. 
Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 302 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting from numerous 
cases describing the incoherence and complexity of free speech jurisprudence as it relates to 
public school student expression); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(granting qualified immunity to school principal because determining when it is permissible to 
restrict student speech “requires recourse to a complicated body of law that seeks, often clumsily, 
to balance a number of competing First Amendment imperatives”); Alan Brownstein, The 
NonForum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech 
Cases Involving School Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 719–84 (2009). 
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2. Explicit and Implicit Disparagement
What else does the Court offer to defend its conclusion that the 
Town of Greece’s practices do not violate religious equality 
principles mandated by the Establishment Clause? In part, the Court 
seems to suggest that the continued offering of sectarian Christian 
prayers to begin Town Board meetings are consistent with religious 
equality values as long as the prayers do not involve a pattern or 
practice of prayers disparaging and denigrating religious minorities 
and non-religious residents.140 Having to listen to a sectarian prayer 
offered by clergy of the majority faith shows no disrespect to 
religious minorities or non-religious residents. Thus, there is no 
constitutionally cognizable burden on religious equality in this 
case.141 
Here, the Court appears to misunderstand the primary thrust of 
plaintiffs’ equality argument. A sectarian prayer of the majority faith 
is not disparaging of minority faiths or non-religious residents. It is 
exclusionary in an important sense, however. A prayer to Jesus 
Christ, Our Lord and Savior, is not a prayer that reflects the beliefs, 
or serves the spiritual needs, of Jews, Moslems or Buddhists. What is 
disparaging and disrespectful is that neither the content of these 
prayers or the Town’s selection process for inviting guest chaplains 
recognized the existence of non-Christians in the community in any 
way. There are various approaches the Town could have adopted to 
demonstrate some awareness of religious pluralism in its 
community—I will discuss these remedial alternatives later in this 
Article—but the key point is that the Town took no steps to 
demonstrate any awareness of its non-Christian residents.142 As 
Because teachers and school administrative officials have to make speech discriminatory 
decisions every day in the regular course of performing their professional duties, the rigorous 
enforcement of student free speech rights places extremely heavy burdens on school authorities. 
Yet, Justice Alito has been insistent that the federal courts must carefully monitor teacher and 
administrative decisions that implicate speech. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422–
25 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999) (en 
banc) (Alito, J., dissenting). Here, unlike Town of Greece, Justice Alito has demonstrated little if 
any concern about local officials and employees beleaguered by uncertain constitutional 
standards. 
140. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825–26.
141. See id. at 1827–28.
142. Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 1850–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Galloway, 681 F.3d
at 31. 
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plaintiffs argued succinctly, the Town “gave the consciences of 
religious minorities no thought at all.”143 That is disparaging. 
Put simply, plaintiffs raised a powerful religious equality 
challenge to the Town of Greece’s prayer practices. The Town’s 
practices were facially discriminatory in inviting guest chaplains to 
offer prayers before Town Board meetings. The Town vested 
discretionary authority in petty officials and provided them 
inadequate guidelines for making decisions that risked being skewed 
by religious bias and favoritism. Whether acting deliberately or 
otherwise, the Town ignored the interests and needs of non-Christian 
residents of the community. As noted above, the Court did not 
provide persuasive specific responses to any of these challenges. It 
did offer one overriding general response, however. The Town’s 
practices constituted legislative prayer. Legislative prayer was a 
historically recognized practice from the beginning of our 
constitutional system, and it was explicitly upheld as constitutional at 
the national and state legislative level in Marsh in 1983.144 To the 
Court, there was nothing about the Town of Greece case that 
distinguished it from Marsh. The same history and tradition that 
justified upholding the legislative prayer practice of the Nebraska 
legislature in Marsh required the Court to uphold the prayer practices 
of the Town of Greece.145 
3. The Relevance and Controlling Authority of Marsh
The Court’s reliance on the tradition of legislative prayer and the 
Marsh decision is not easily defended, however. First, there is debate 
as to whether the tradition supporting legislative prayer and the 
Marsh decision covers a consistent pattern of sectarian prayers.146 
Second, and much more importantly, there were numerous, 
constitutionally-salient differences that distinguished state-sponsored 
prayers at the state legislative level or before Congress and state 
sponsored prayers before local government meetings, such as a town 
board meeting. I will address most of these distinctions in the section 
143. Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 36.
144. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
145. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (“The Court’s inquiry, then, must be to
determine whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”); id. at 1833–34 (Alito, J., concurring). 
146. See, e.g., Brief for Paul Finkelman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Town
of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (No. 12-696); Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 41–47. 
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of this Article dealing with religious liberty and coercion. But it is 
important to note here that the essential identity of legislative prayer 
before state and national legislative sessions and legislative prayer 
before town board meetings is critical to the Court’s analysis and 
holding. As Justice Kennedy concedes, there was no evidence in the 
record before the Court of any pervasive tradition of state sponsored 
prayer before local government meetings.147 The historical evidence 
on which the Court relied applied to prayers before Congress and 
state legislatures.148 If prayers before town board meetings raised 
distinctive constitutional questions that differentiated these cases 
from Establishment Clause challenges to state and congressional 
prayer practices, the Court could not rely on either history and 
long-standing tradition or the precedent of Marsh to respond to 
plaintiffs’ powerful religious equality arguments. 
As plaintiffs and the dissenting Justices argued, there are 
substantial and salient differences between the nature and setting of 
legislative prayer upheld in Marsh and the setting and prayer practice 
challenged in Town of Greece.149 The legislative prayer upheld in 
Marsh was an internal legislative procedure directed at the legislative 
body itself, not at the public-at-large or audience members in the 
gallery. The prayers at issue in Town of Greece were directed at the 
members of the public attending the meeting.150 This distinction has 
substantial historical relevance. Whether the tradition of legislative 
chaplains offering prayers before state legislatures or Congress 
included a pattern of sectarian prayers or not, a different tradition, 
limiting state-sponsored religious expression to relatively 
non-sectarian messages, applied to state-sponsored religious 
messages directed to the public. As even Justice Scalia, surely no fan 
of a rigorously enforced Establishment Clause, acknowledged, 
[O]ur constitutional tradition, from the Declaration of
Independence and the first inaugural address of
Washington . . . down to the present day, has, with a few
aberrations, ruled out of order government-sponsored
endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is
147. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
148. See id. at 1823–25; id. at 1829–30, 1833–34 (Alito, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1847–49 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 41–48.
150. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1847–48 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondents, supra note 3, at 43. 
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sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men 
and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent 
Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for 
example, the divinity of Christ).151 
Plaintiffs relied on this tradition restricting government religious 
speech to the public to non-sectarian messages and emphasized 
Justice Scalia’s recognition of this historical account in their briefs 
and oral argument.152 
The response to these arguments by Justices Scalia and Kennedy 
are as bewildering as they are disturbing. Justice Scalia simply 
ignores the statements in his prior opinions and says nothing to 
reconcile his upholding of sectarian prayers in this case with his 
repeated recognition of the tradition of non-sectarian state sponsored 
religious messages directed at citizens. Justice Kennedy argues that 
the “principal audience” for the prayers offered by guest chaplains at 
Town Board meetings in the Town of Greece is “not . . . the public 
but [the] lawmakers themselves.”153 
To put it bluntly, this contention makes no sense. It suggests an 
understanding of social reality that bears little resemblance to the 
experience and perception of real people. Here, as will also be 
discussed infra in the section of this Article discussing religious 
liberty and coercion concerns, Justice Kennedy seems so determined 
to squeeze square facts into round doctrinal holes that he asserts 
factual inferences that have no support other than that they are a 
necessary foundation for his legal conclusions. If accepted history 
and Establishment Clause doctrine only permit state-sponsored 
sectarian prayers when such prayers are directed internally to the 
members of the legislature, then Justice Kennedy will construe the 
prayers offered at the Town of Greece Board meetings to be directed 
at the Town’s Board Members, notwithstanding the counter-factual 
nature of this conclusion. 
The guest chaplain at Town of Greece Board meetings stood 
with his back to the Board and faced the audience of town residents. 
Frequently, the prayer-giver asked the audience to stand, bow their 
151. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
152. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 33, 47–50; Transcript of Oral Argument at
32:1–7, 45:15–23, Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (No. 12-696), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-696_i4ep.pdf. 
153. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
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heads and join in the prayer. Audience members responded by doing 
so—demonstrating that they fully understood the guest chaplain’s 
prayers to be directed at them.154 The chaplain commonly prayed in 
the name of the audience155—treating residents attending the board 
meeting as if they were members of his own congregation.156 Yet, 
Justice Kennedy insists that the prayers offered at Town Board 
meetings were directed to the Board members sitting behind the 
guest chaplain and not to the public audience he was so obviously 
addressing. 
Yet another perplexing aspect of the Court’s reliance on Marsh 
to respond to plaintiffs’ religious equality arguments is the stark 
dissonance between the prayer-practice upheld in Marsh and the 
constitutional requirements the Court appears to require for the Town 
of Greece’s state-sponsored prayers. The Court repeatedly justifies 
its holding in Town of Greece on the condition that the Town’s 
selection of chaplains was not discriminatory and included a rotation 
of all the faiths in the community seeking to participate in this 
opportunity.157 In Marsh, however, there was no such open invitation 
or rotating procedure. The same paid Protestant chaplain offered the 
prayers before the legislature for eighteen years, yet the Court saw no 
problem with such denominational exclusivity. Lower courts have 
read Marsh as permitting at least some level of denominational 
discrimination in choosing prayer-givers at local government 
meetings.158 If Marsh is controlling precedent, why does the Court 
insist that town boards cannot discriminate on the basis of religious 
belief and affiliation in inviting guest chaplains to offer prayers 
before meetings? The Court’s opinion provides no answer to this 
question. 
154. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 11.
155. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 24, 32 (2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014). 
156. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826.
157. See supra note 105.
158. See, e.g., Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir.
2005) (upholding selection procedure that excludes members of Wicca religion from list of clergy 
eligible to be invited to offer prayers at county board meetings under the authority of Marsh). 
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IV. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND COERCION
A. The Salient Distinctions Relating to Coercion Between
 Prayers at Local Board Meetings and  Prayers 
Before Congress or a State Legislature 
The issue of coercion and the protection of religious liberty 
played two distinct, but overlapping, roles in the Town of Greece 
dispute and decision. First, to the extent that the setting of prayer 
practices in the Town of Greece raised concerns about coercion that 
were not present when prayers are offered before state legislatures or 
Congress, the holding in Marsh and the historical tradition on which 
it is based would be distinguishable from the present case and would 
not control its analysis. Second, as even Justice Kennedy concedes, 
government coercion of religious exercise violates the Establishment 
Clause.159 It is an unacceptable abridgement of religious liberty for 
government to coerce participation in worship services. 
The Marsh decision did not focus on the coercion of members of 
the public viewing sessions of the state legislature or Congress from 
the gallery. There was little reason for it to do so. As noted 
previously, the prayers offered before the Nebraska legislative 
sessions upheld in Marsh were internal matters directed to the 
legislators, not the public. Of equal if not greater importance, visitors 
in the gallery of state legislative sessions are there as passive 
observers. Legislators are rarely aware of their identity or their 
presence. There is no interaction between the public and 
decision-makers.160 
Even in the extremely unlikely event that a member of the 
legislature noticed a specific visitor’s conduct while a prayer was 
being offered, the legislator would have no basis for identifying the 
visitor or associating him or her with any matter being discussed by 
the legislature. Further, if a state legislator or member of Congress 
somehow did recognize a visitor who, for example, failed to stand 
while a prayer was offered, and somehow knew the visitor’s position 
on some bill before the legislature, it is hardly conceivable that the 
legislator would allow one’s person’s conduct to influence a broad 
policy decision impacting the lives of thousands or tens of thousands 
159. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826–27.
160. See id. at 1847–48 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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of other persons. There is nothing intrinsically coercive of the public 
when prayers are offered before state legislatures or Congress. 
The situation is entirely different when prayers are offered at a 
small town board meeting. Most of what Congress or a state 
legislature does involves the formulation and enactment of general 
laws that impact large groups and constituencies. By contrast, town 
boards regularly deal with issues affecting small groups and 
individuals. Land use decisions impact individual parcel owners and 
specific neighborhoods. Budget decisions may burden particular 
small constituencies. Sometimes town boards act as administrative 
tribunals in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity, hearing personnel 
grievances or zoning appeals. Thus, these local government meetings 
are much more likely to be focused on the needs and interests of 
individuals than are a state legislature’s sessions. The distinction 
between legislative, administrative, and executive action often has 
little utility and meaning at town board meetings. 
More importantly, citizens who watch the deliberations of 
Congress or a state legislature from the gallery are passive observers. 
They have no role to play in the legislative process. They are no 
more involved in the government’s decisions than viewers who 
watch the legislature’s sessions at home on CSPAN. 
Citizens who attend town board meetings are not passive 
witnesses of government operations. They attend board meetings to 
participate in government by speaking to the board during public 
comment periods. They expect to be seen and heard by the board. 
Their goal is to influence decision-makers. Their ability to address 
the board in person, to tell the board their side of the story, is an 
important right of political participation. 
Finally, outside of major metropolitan areas, there are 
substantial differences between the size and format of state and 
national legislative chambers and town board meeting rooms. State 
legislators and members of Congress rarely know who is sitting in 
the gallery. The size of the chambers and the number of legislators 
and visitors preclude any such knowledge or sense of familiarity. 
The small meeting rooms of town board sessions are different. Here, 
the physical proximity between the board and the audience, and the 
limited number of participants, make it far easier for board members 
to be aware of their audience. 
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Because of these differences, the decision in Marsh tells us very 
little about the coercive nature of government-sponsored prayer at 
town board meetings. In the setting of a town board meeting, citizens 
are coerced when they are asked to stand or otherwise affirm the 
prayer that is being offered in their name. A failure to comply would 
risk alienating the very political decision-makers whom they hope to 
influence. 
Town residents speaking at meetings know that the board’s 
decisions will often involve substantial political discretion in 
weighing the competing concerns of relatively small constituencies. 
Residents will justly fear that if they refuse to join in prayers offered 
by clergy invited by the board, the board will respond less favorably 
to their needs and concerns than it will to other speakers in the 
audience who do join in the offered prayers.161 
B. What Constitutes Coercion
Plaintiffs’ coercion arguments here could hardly be more 
persuasive or more compelling. When government officials are 
empowered to exercise discretionary authority over individuals, these 
officials, directly or through invited clergy, cannot “request” that 
individuals dependent on the way that power is exercised join the 
officials in prayer before a decision of importance to the individual is 
reached. The invitation to pray in such circumstances is intrinsically 
coercive. To emphasize this point, Justice Kagan uses the example of 
a trial judge inviting a minister into the courtroom who asks the 
litigants to rise while he expresses a sectarian prayer.162 
161. Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra note 126, at 1530–31.
162. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The focus of Justice
Kagan’s powerful dissenting opinion is religious equality, not religious liberty. Her primary 
concern is the alignment of the state with a particular religion, not with the coercive impact of the 
Town of Greece’s prayer practices on residents attending town board meetings. Many of the 
examples and arguments she offers, however, seem to reflect concerns about coercion as much as 
they do concerns about religious equality. Indeed, in reading Justice Kagan’s dissent one often 
expects an argument describing a coercive context to conclude by identifying the situation as one 
that abridges religious liberty by unconstitutionally coercing participation in religion exercise. At 
the last minute, however, Justice Kagan seems to shift gears and describes the problem in 
religious equality terms. Consider this paragraph in her dissent: 
A person goes to court, to the polls, to a naturalization ceremony—and a government 
official or his hand-picked minister asks her, as the first order of official business, to 
stand and pray with others in a way conflicting with her own religious beliefs. Perhaps 
she feels sufficient pressure to go along—to rise, bow her head, and join in whatever 
others are saying: After all, she wants, very badly, what the judge or poll worker or 
immigration official has to offer. Or perhaps she is made of stronger mettle, and she 
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Similar coercive circumstances arise when an individual seeks a 
determination of his or her eligibility for benefits from a government 
bureaucrat or when a small town legislature deliberates on a matter 
of particular importance to a small group of residents. The pressure 
to comply with the invitation to rise and join in the offered prayer 
should be obvious to anyone. But it is not obvious to the Court. 
Justice Kennedy acknowledges, as he must, that coercing 
participation in religious exercise violates the Establishment 
Clause.163 He also recognizes, correctly, that an inquiry into coercion 
is “a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the 
prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”164 In 
conducting that inquiry, however, Justice Kennedy ignores important 
facts and circumstances. More egregiously, his description of the 
social reality and facts he does discuss is implausible at best. In an 
effort to be charitable, I can only say that it is a description of reality 
that neither I nor anyone I know shares or understands. 
1. Prayers by Guest Chaplains Are No Less Coercive
than Prayers by Board Members 
As noted, the Justice Kennedy begins his attempt to refute 
plaintiffs’ coercion claims by arguing that the prayers offered by 
guest chaplains at Town Board meetings were directed at the Board 
members, not the town residents attending Board meetings. That 
distorted characterization of the prayer practices at Town of Greece 
Board meetings is only the first of Justice Kennedy’s, let us say, 
unusual understandings of the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Justice Kennedy also emphasizes that it is guest chaplains rather than 
Board members themselves who direct audience members to rise, 
opts not to participate in what she does not believe—indeed, what would, for her, be 
something like blasphemy. She then must make known her dissent from the common 
religious view, and place herself apart from other citizens, as well as from the officials 
responsible for the invocations. And so a civic function of some kind brings religious 
differences to the fore: That public proceeding becomes (whether intentionally or not) 
an instrument for dividing her from adherents to the community’s majority religion, 
and for altering the very nature of her relationship with her government. 
Id. at 1844. I do not doubt that these examples raise serious religious equality concerns. It seems 
odd, however, to discuss these hypotheticals solely in terms of how they divide people from each 
other on religious grounds while ignoring the burden on religious liberty they impose on 
minorities by pressuring them to join in the majority’s religious exercise. 
163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
164. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
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bow their heads, and join in the offered prayers.165 While this is true, 
it is hard to understand why Justice Kennedy believes that it 
mitigates in any way the coercive nature of these requests.  
Plaintiffs argue that if a citizen is seeking benefits or actions 
from a deliberative body or government official who has the 
discretionary authority to make decisions that will seriously impact 
the citizen’s wellbeing, it is intrinsically coercive for the citizen to be 
asked to engage in a religious exercise such as a prayer before 
submitting his request to the government decision-maker. The 
government decision-maker could be a public employer evaluating 
job applicants, or determining promotions. It could be a teacher 
supervising and evaluating public school students. It could be a judge 
presiding over a trial. Or it could be a town board making 
administrative and legislative decisions involving small groups in the 
community or individual residents. In all of these examples, if the 
employer, teacher, judge, or board in their official capacity asks 
citizens to pray, the request is intrinsically coercive. Citizens will 
naturally feel pressured to comply in order to avoid alienating 
government decision-makers who have so much discretionary 
authority over the citizen’s interests. In these circumstances why 
would anyone think that there is a distinction between the town 
board members asking the audience to stand and pray and the invited 
clergy offering the prayer directing them to do so? If a judge, 
employer or teacher invited clergy to offer a prayer and litigants and 
counsel, employees, and students were directed by the invited clergy 
to pray, the coercive nature of the circumstance would not be 
significantly reduced. 
2. Coercion Exists Without Explicit Threats
or Formal Penalties 
Even if the Town Board itself rather than the invited clergy 
directed audience members to rise, bow their heads, and join in 
prayer, the Court seems to suggest that such requests would still not 
constitute unconstitutional coercion. Justices Thomas and Scalia 
clearly would reach this conclusion. From their perspective, religious 
coercion is only constitutionally problematic if it is imposed “by 
165. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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force of law and threat of penalty.”166 Implicit coercion has no 
constitutional significance for these Justices. Presumably, they would 
have found no constitutionally problematic coercion in the various 
hypotheticals involving prayer requests described in Justice Kagan’s 
dissent.167 
Some of the language in Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to 
echo this position. He appears to reject plaintiffs’ coercion claims 
because Board members never told residents that the Board’s 
decision “might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the 
prayer opportunity.”168 Similarly, he explains, “Nothing in the record 
indicates that town leaders allocated benefits and burdens based on 
participation in the prayer, or that citizens were received differently 
depending on whether they joined the invocation or quietly 
declined.”169 This suggests that Justices Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito 
agree with Justices Thomas and Scalia that there must be an actual 
threat of penalty or imposition of a penalty (or denial of benefits) for 
claims of religious coercion to be upheld. 
Other language suggests a more fact-based understanding of 
Justice Kennedy’s argument. Here, Justice Kennedy does not appear 
to be insisting, as do Justices Thomas and Scalia, that as a matter of 
law, coercion must be imposed by explicit threats or penalties. He is 
arguing as a matter of fact and social reality that without explicit 
threats or a history of the sanctioning of dissidents audience 
members cannot reasonably claim to feel pressured by the prayer 
practices they challenge. Pursuant to Justice Kennedy’s 
understanding of human behavior, “Should nonbelievers choose to 
exit the room during a prayer they find distasteful, their absence will 
not stand out as disrespectful or even noteworthy. And should they 
remain, their quiet acquiescence will not, in light of our traditions, be 
interpreted as an agreement with the words or ideas expressed.”170 
Thus, Justice Kennedy suggests that implied coercion might exist in 
some circumstance, but not in this one. 
Once again, it is hard to make sense of observations about social 
reality that bear so little resemblance to the world I experience. 
166. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1837 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
167. See id. at 1842–43 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1826 (majority opinion).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1827.
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Given the small number of residents in the audience of small town 
meetings (typically ten or less at the Town of Greece’s meetings), I 
would expect that anyone who stood up and walked out during a 
prayer would be immediately noticed. They would have every reason 
to worry that their conduct would be considered disrespectful and 
that the board would be negatively influenced by their behavior. 
Would anyone seriously advise a friend or colleague planning on 
addressing a small town board meeting on an important matter that 
they should have no concerns or inhibitions about standing up and 
leaving the room during a prayer they found objectionable because 
no one would notice or be upset by their behavior? 
The intrinsic coercion in the Town of Greece’s prayer practice is 
an unavoidable result of the Board’s discretionary power and the 
obvious value it assigns to the offering of prayers to begin its 
meetings. In such circumstances, the normal response of an 
individual subject to an official’s exercise of discretionary power 
would be to worry that a failure to comply with a “request” to pray 
would adversely influence the official’s decisions in a way that 
would be detrimental to the individual’s needs and interests. This is 
the common understanding when participation in prayer is requested 
by school authorities. Thus, for example, when a public high school 
coach asked team members to kneel, or stand and bow their heads at 
prayers offered during team dinners and in the locker room, it is 
hardly surprising that dissident students would feel pressure to 
participate because they “would not want to disappoint the coach” or 
that a student would fear “that if he did not go along with what was 
obviously the coach’s desire, he would not get playing time.”171 
Similar concerns about coercion arise when citizens seek the 
discretionary assistance of public employees and are confronted with 
requests to join the employee in prayer. Accordingly, courts have 
upheld regulations prohibiting a state social worker from sharing his 
faith with clients and praying with them on the job. Clients go to the 
171. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 182 (3rd Cir. 2008) (McKee, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). In another example, a high school teacher 
publicly chastised a student for refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In holding that the 
teacher violated the student’s First Amendment rights, the court explained: “Given the gross 
disparity in power between a teacher and a student, such comments . . . coming from an authority 
figure with tremendous discretionary authority . . . cannot help but have a tremendous chilling 
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 
F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004).
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offices of the Department of Social Services to “seek assistance” 
from “an agent of the state.” If the social worker from whom they 
seek assistance asks them to pray, “they may well be motivated to 
seeks ways to ingratiate themselves” with the state’s agent.172 
Intrinsic coercion is also easily recognized in the relationship 
between supervisors and public employees. OPM Guidelines on 
Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal 
Workplace state: 
Because supervisors have the power to hire, fire, or 
promote, employees may reasonably perceive their 
supervisors’ religious expression as coercive, even if it was 
not intended as such. Therefore, supervisors should be 
careful to ensure that their statements and actions are such 
that employees do not perceive any coercion of religious or 
non-religious behavior (or respond as if such coercion is 
occurring), and should, where necessary, take appropriate 
steps to dispel such misperceptions.173 
This common sense understanding of implicit compulsion and the 
reasonable fear of consequences for failing to comply is recognized 
in so many settings and circumstances that it is difficult to 
understand Justice Kennedy’s contention that it does not exist in the 
chambers of a town board meeting. 
3. Competing Traditions as to the Meaning of Coerced Attendance
at Prayers and Standing During Prayers
In refuting plaintiffs’ religious coercion claims, Justice Kennedy
also seems to suggest that plaintiffs are not being required to do 
anything of religious or expressive significance. He contends that “in 
light of our traditions” involving legislative prayer, no one would 
think that an audience member standing up (and perhaps bowing his 
head) while the prayer was expressed was joining in the prayer.174 
On its face, this seems to be obviously wrong. A member of the 
clergy treats the audience as if it was the congregation at his house of 
worship.175 He asks the audience to rise and bow their heads and 
172. Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 447 F.3d 642, 650–51 (9th Cir. 2006).
173. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Guidelines on Religious
Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace (Aug. 14, 1997), reprinted in CCH 
INC., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE ¶ 3814 (2014). 
174. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
175. See id. at 1826.
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pray with him.176 The prayer he offers is in the name of the 
audience.177 Everyone in the room rises in response to the 
prayer-giver’s request. Most do so for the express purpose of joining 
in the prayer. Why would anyone think that a particular person rising 
and bowing his head in such circumstances is not joining in the 
prayer? 
Justice Kennedy’s answer is that because of the tradition of 
legislative prayer, it is common knowledge that the expression of 
prayer in this circumstance serves a secular, ceremonial, solemnizing 
purpose.178 Standing and bowing one’s head is understood to reflect 
respect for that tradition and the function it serves. It does not 
involve religious exercise or signify participation in the prayer being 
offered. As Justice Kagan suggests, the Court acts as if by mere 
reference to the tradition of legislative prayer, it can transform 
sectarian “statements of profound belief and deep meaning” that go 
to “a core aspect of [a person’s] identity” into mere ceremony.179 
Justice Kennedy reads far too much into the alleged tradition he 
describes. First, as a general rule, people do communicate 
acquiescence to a message when they stand while it is expressed. 
When people stand when the national anthem is played before a 
sporting event begins, most would explain their conduct as an 
expression of patriotism that is shared by the entire audience. 
Second, jurors and scholars seriously dispute the meaning and scope 
of the tradition he describes. Indeed, plaintiffs and the dissenting 
Justices emphatically dispute the extension of this tradition to small 
town board meetings.180 Accordingly, it is hardly clear that 
laypersons in the audience are so familiar with Justice Kennedy’s 
interpretation of this tradition that it colors their understanding of the 
prayer practice sponsored by the Town Board. Third, the idea that 
the content of the prayer is irrelevant to audience members in the 
context of legislative prayers because they are simply standing to 
show respect for tradition and the beliefs of others cannot be 
grounded in the facts of Marsh. Under Justice Kennedy’s analysis, it 
would make little sense for Jewish legislators to tell the legislative 
176. See supra notes 40 and 60 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
178. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
179. Id. at 1853 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 1851–52; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22.
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chaplain in Nebraska that his praying in Christ’s name was a matter 
of concern to them. Yet the Court in Marsh understood these 
requests, and the Chaplain’s response of making the prayers more 
generic, to be perfectly reasonable, whether or not the response was 
constitutionally required.181 
a. American tradition rejects coerced attendance at prayers
Fourth and most importantly, Justice Kennedy completely
ignores two other American traditions that compete with the tradition 
of legislative prayer. These alternative traditions would color the 
understanding of the prayer practice at town board meetings and 
suggest that the tradition of legislative prayer should be construed 
cautiously and narrowly. One tradition is historical. Americans from 
the colonial period onward have insisted on their right to control 
their decisions as to the religious congregation they will join, the 
services they will attend, and the clergy with whom they will 
worship.182 As Michael Paulsen argues in his defense of the Court’s 
holding in Lee v. Weisman striking down state-sponsored prayers at 
public school graduations,183 focusing on the public’s historical 
acceptance of state-sponsored prayers to solemnize public events and 
activities only tells one half of the story. “[T]he evidence is also clear 
that compelled attendance at a religious worship service was 
regarded as one of the defining characteristics (and most hated 
features) of religious establishments.”184 
As Paulsen explains, “government induced attendance at a 
prayer ceremony violates this historical principle.”185 Nor should the 
brevity of the event excuse this constitutional violation. “Surely,” 
Paulsen concludes, “the state could not compel attendance at a ten-
minute Mass or a five-minute sermon.”186 Yet Justice Kennedy’s 
181. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791–95 (1983).
182. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 21
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 201, 233–36, 241–45 (2013); ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL 
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (1744), reprinted in AM. HERITAGE SERIES, THE
GREAT AWAKENING 323, 326–29 (Alan Heimert & Perry Miller eds., 1967). The Court’s opinion
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702–03 (2012) reflects some recognition of how important it was to
colonists and the Framers for individuals to be free to choose the clergy with whom they would
choose to pray.
183. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992).
184. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 828 (1993).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 829.
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opinion reads as if American resistance to the use of government 
power to influence attendance and participation at prayer services or 
the selection of clergy leading worship had no place in our 
constitutional tradition. To the contrary, it is this tradition of 
challenges to government induced attendance at prayer ceremonies 
and government involvement in the selection of clergy that must 
serve as the compelling backdrop behind which the more limited 
tradition of legislative prayer should be understood. 
b. Prayer is a personal, meaningful communication
between the individual and G-d 
The other tradition is cultural and religious, and it substantially 
predates any use of prayer to begin legislative sessions. For many if 
not most Americans, prayer is a personal, meaningful 
communication between the person expressing the prayer and G-d.187 
It is not an abstract or rote means of solemnizing secular activities. 
As Judge John Noonan explains, through religious exercise and 
prayer “[h]eart speaks to heart. . . . [and it expresses] the living 
communication between believer and God” that is the essence of 
religion.188 In reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion, one searches in 
vain for any recognition of the meaning religious people assign to 
prayer or how foreign his description of legislative prayer is to that 
more basic understanding of what prayer is. Legislative prayer, it 
seems, involves everything except what prayer is conventionally 
recognized to be—a heartfelt, personal communication between men 
and women and G-d.189 When people are asked to pray and a 
187. See, e.g., Kevin L. Ladd & Daniel N. McIntosh, Meaning, God, and Prayer: Physical
and Metaphysical Aspects of Social Support, 11 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & CULTURE 23, 29 
(2008) (defining prayer as the “intentional expression of one’s self in an attempt to establish or 
enhance connectivity with the divine, with others in a religious or spiritual framework, and with 
the self”). 
188. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1–2 (1998). 
189. To Jews, for example, “prayer is our way of communicating with God.” REUVEN
HAMMER, ENTERING JEWISH PRAYER: A GUIDE TO PERSONAL DEVOTION AND THE WORSHIP 
SERVICE 3 (1994). More specifically, “[p]rayer is the conscious expression of [our] relationship 
[with God], the moments and hours we devote exclusively to developing that connection: 
addressing ourselves to God, speaking about God, listening to the words of God.” Id. at 6. One 
Christian author describes prayer this way. “When we pray, we use words (spoken out loud or 
silently) and gestures to express what we believe about God and how we think about our 
relationship to God and to one another. In prayer, we communicate how God is active and present 
to us. In faith, we pray, believing that God is concerned about and responsive to human need. 
Prayer expresses our personal relationship to God—a relationship that God intends and initiates 
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member of the clergy prays in their name before a town board 
meeting begins, the legislative setting and allegedly neutral tradition 
surrounding the prayer may not easily transform the intrinsic nature 
of prayer for the audience asked to stand during its recital.  
Indeed, Justice Kennedy not only ignores this tradition, but 
inexplicably he never actually addresses the obvious question of 
whether standing and bowing one’s head while a prayer is expressed 
in his or her name constitutes the exercise of religion for the 
participant. Justice Kennedy’s primary focus is on how the audience 
member’s conduct appears to others.190 He does not consider the 
experience of standing and bowing one’s head from the audience 
member’s perspective. 
Justice Kennedy also ignores the role that physical movement 
plays in religious exercise and prayer. To Justice Kennedy, standing 
silently is a secular expression of respect. Certainly, there are 
occasions when this is the only way to understand this physical 
movement, such as when the audience is called on to rise when a 
judge enters the courtroom. There is no common tradition for 
standing during local board meetings, however, on which to build 
this secular interpretation of standing during an opening prayer. 
More importantly, again, there is a powerful tradition recognizing the 
act of standing during the expression of a prayer as an essential part 
of a religious exercise. As Justice Douglas noted, “The act of praying 
often involves body posture and movement as well as utterances.”191 
The meaningful role of posture and movements in prayer cannot 
seriously be disputed. Often, worship involves acts as well as 
words.192 Formal postures and gestures accompany spoken prayer 
and that we accept through the intercession of the Holy Spirit. . . . In the end, prayer is about a 
relationship in which we see God face to face as God loves us, with unflinching mercy, and gives 
God’s self as a gift to each and every one of us. We give ourselves to God in return.” PATRICIA 
D. BROWN, PATHS TO PRAYER 15 (2003).
190. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014) (contending that a
dissenter’s standing quietly while a state-sponsored prayer is expressed “will not . . . be 
interpreted as an agreement with the words or ideas expressed”); supra notes 169–76 and 
accompanying text. 
191. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra
notes 169–76 and accompanying text. 
192. See, e.g., ROY A. RAPPAPORT, ECOLOGY, MEANING, AND RELIGION 199 (1st ed. 1979)
(emphasizing that, “Liturgy’s acts may . . . speak more clearly than words”). 
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and play an important communicative role in the act of worship.193 
Different postures are associated with different faith traditions, but 
the importance of physical movement to prayer is common to many 
faiths.194 For example, the physical movements accompanying 
Islamic prayer are structured and complex. Because daily “[p]rayer 
for a Muslim involves uniting mind, soul, and body in worship . . . a 
Muslim carrying out these prayers will perform a whole series of set 
movements that go with the words of the prayer.”195 Standing, 
bowing one’s head and kneeling are important aspects of Christian 
worship for many denominations.196 
Standing is a particularly meaningful posture for prayer in many 
faith traditions. Jews do not always stand when they recite prayers, 
but standing while praying has special significance. Indeed, 
“standing is perhaps the most essential physical position of Jewish 
prayer.”197 The most central prayer in the Jewish service, the Amidah 
(the standing prayer), is recited while standing.198 Standing is 
required for reciting the Amidah, while it is not required for other 
prayers, because the Amidah “is a prayer addressed directly to 
God.”199 
Standing and kneeling are important communicative features of 
Catholic worship as well. As one author explained, “The postures 
193. Id. at 199–200; Frederick Mathewson Denny, Postures and Gestures, in LINDSAY JONES
ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 7341 (2d ed. 2005); Heather M. Erb, Prayer Postures: 
What They Mean & Why They Matter, 79 NEW OXFORD REV. 37 (Apr. 2012). 
194. See, e.g., Denny, supra note 193, at 7341–42; Ladd & McIntosh, supra note 187, at 32;
Vasile Vlad, The Bodily Forms of the Prayer in Eastern Christian Spirituality, 5 SCI. J. 
HUMANISTIC STUD. 166 (2013). 
195. Salat: Daily Prayers, BBC (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions
/islam/practices/salat.shtml. 
196. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Customs in the Episcopal Church, ALL 
SAINTS’ EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CLINTON, S.C., http://allsaintsclinton.org/faqcustoms.html (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2014) (explaining that Episcopalians bow their heads at the name of Jesus in the 
creeds and stand for the reading of the Gospel “out of respect for our Lord and the good news he 
brought us . . . .”); TERESA A. BLYTHE, 50 WAYS TO PRAY 85–97 (2006). 
197. Joshua Rabin, Physical Movement in Jewish Prayer: Speaking to God Through the Body,
MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/practices/Ritual/Prayer/Prayer_Music
_and_Liturgy/Physical_Movement.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2014). 
198. See YITZCHOK KIRZNER, THE ART OF JEWISH PRAYER 29–30 (1991).
199. See HAMMER, supra note 189, at 156. Uri Ehrlich explains the obligation for Jews to
stand while praying in somewhat similar terms. “What is of consequence is the worshiper’s 
perception of prayer as an interpersonal relationship, similar to a student-master relationship; 
hence the obligation to stand. If prayer is conceptualized as building a close experiential 
encounter with the divine presence, in such a situation, as in the case of close proximity to a sage, 
a standing posture is manifestly the appropriate one.” URI EHRLICH, THE NONVERBAL 
LANGUAGE OF PRAYER: A NEW APPROACH TO JEWISH LITURGY 16 (Dena Ordan trans., 2004). 
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that we [Catholics] take during the liturgy are not empty rituals, but 
they each have a meaning and a certain power of their own, greatly 
influencing our experience. A common posture is a sign of the unity 
of the Christian community gathered for the sacred liturgy. . . .”200 
More specifically, “Standing is the primary posture that we take at 
Mass since it best embodies the active stance of the participants. . . . 
We stand to make a commitment.”201 Standing during other rituals 
serve “as a sign of our active participation” in the worship service.202 
Once again, it is this background understanding of the role that 
physical movements such as standing and bowing one’s head play in 
prayer that renders Justice Kennedy’s conclusions about the prayer 
practices of the Town of Greece so myopic. Standing while prayers 
are recited is the embodiment of religious exercise for some faiths. It 
may be a distortion of the physical requirements of prayer for 
others.203 The religious significance of physical movement in the act 
of prayer cannot be cavalierly subsumed by repeated references to 
the tradition of legislative prayer. 
4. Coercion and the Timing of Prayers
Another argument related to the coercion of audience members 
is the suggestion that the timing of the prayer might have some 
relevance to its constitutionality. Justice Kennedy emphasized that 
the prayer is offered “during the ceremonial portion of the town’s 
meeting” when the board members “are not engaged in 
policymaking.”204 It is possible to imply from this language that 
prayers offered while the Board was engaged in its policymaking 
functions would raise more serious concerns. Arguably, the 
ceremonial activities occurring immediately after the prayer is 
offered contribute to the understanding that the prayer serves a 
200. Judith H. Bullock, Posture at Mass: Standing, ARCHDIOCESE OF LOUISVILLE,
http://www.archlou.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/PostureatMassStanding.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2014). 
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. State-sponsored prayer practices create conflicts for religious minorities not only with
regard to the words of the prayer, but also because of the physical movements accompanying the 
verbal expression of the prayer. For example, a Jewish parent objecting to the Regents Prayer that 
was ultimately struck down in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), argued “the children have 
been taught to clasp their hands when they pray. We are Jewish and do not clasp our hands when 
we pray.” See also BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: HOW ENGEL V. 
VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 83 (Univ. Press of Kan. ed., 2007). 
204. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014).
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purely ceremonial function, and the time during which the 
presentation of awards and other ceremonial activities take place 
serves as a temporal buffer between the offering of the prayer and the 
public comment period during which residents may address and 
petition the Board. 
It is doubtful that Justice Kennedy assigned much weight to the 
temporal buffer argument, however. As plaintiffs argued, over 40 
percent of the time, there were no ceremonial activities at Town of 
Greece Board meetings and public comment immediately followed 
the offering of the prayer.205 If the Court actually believed that close 
proximity of the prayer to public comment and policy-making 
deliberations was significant, it is hard to understand why Justice 
Kennedy did not even mention how often that proximity occurred. 
Justice Alito appeared to recognize the possibility that prayer 
practices like those in the Town of Greece may pressure and coerce 
residents in the audience to participate in the prayer. He pointedly 
noted that the prayers at issue in this case took place before the 
legislative part of the board meeting. More importantly, Justice Alito 
insisted that this case did not involve (and therefore one would 
assume does not determine) the constitutionality of prayers offered 
prior to adjudicatory proceedings.206 Justice Alito conceded that the 
matters decided during the legislative portion of the meeting may 
“involve very specific questions,” but he argued that this reality 
“does not transform the nature of this part of the meeting.”207 
This section of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is significant 
for several reasons. Arguably, it limits the scope of the Court’s 
holding to only upholding prayers before local government meetings 
involving formally legislative proceedings.208 It certainly suggests 
greater consideration and concern for the coercive consequences of 
state-sponsored prayer than Justice Kennedy’s opinion. If implicit 
coercion is never constitutionally significant, it is hard to know why 
Justice Alito would distinguish prayers before adjudicatory 
205. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 28.
206. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. There is considerable debate as to whether the concurring opinion of a Justice who joins
the majority opinion should bind or even influence lower court interpretations of the Court’s 
holding and reasoning. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, A Potential Guide to the Meaning of 
Hobby Lobby: Why Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion May be Key, Part I, JUSTIA VERDICT 
(July 18, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/07/18/potential-guide-meaning-hobby-lobby. 
Winter 2014] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 415 
proceedings and suggest that they required additional constitutional 
attention. The implication here is that the petitioner in an 
adjudicatory hearing is sufficiently vulnerable to the implicitly 
coercive impact of prayer requests to warrant judicial intervention, 
but a person expressing views during public comment at a legislative 
meeting does not merit the Court’s concern. 
Justice Alito’s position is not entirely without merit. As a formal 
matter, the process of decision-making, including the possibility of 
meaningful appeals, varies between legislative and adjudicatory 
proceedings.209 Further some legislative decisions, even at a small 
town board meeting, will involve such broad policy matters that 
affect so many people that a board member’s distaste for a few 
residents that refuse to join the state-sponsored prayer is unlikely to 
control his or her ultimate decision on the merits. 
It is also true, however, that the identification of specific board 
actions as either legislative or adjudicatory is often indeterminate. 
The process of decision-making may be formally different, but the 
categorization of matters into one class or another is arbitrary in 
many cases.210 
209. Unlike quasi-judicial proceedings, legislative decisions typically do not require formal
hearings or clear explanations justifying their enactment. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466−69 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that a local zoning commission’s 
“decision to approve or disapprove a site plan is a legislative rather than adjudicative decision,” 
the court stated that the commission is not required to conduct “adjudicative-type procedures, to 
give reasons for their enactments, or to act ‘reasonably’ in the sense in which courts are required 
to do”). They are also often subject to extremely deferential standards of review. See, e.g., 
Petersen v. Riverton City, 243 P. 3d 1261, 1265 (Utah 2010) (having determined that city’s land 
use decision was legislative rather than quasi-judicial, court applies “the highly deferential 
reasonably debatable standard” to review the city’s action rather than the more rigorous 
substantial evidence standard of review).  
210. As land use expert Daniel Mandelker explains, in land-use regulation cases “[s]ome
courts hold a legislature acts legislatively even when it exercises administrative functions and do 
not require standards for the exercise of those functions. . . . [Other courts, to the contrary, hold] 
the character of the function the legislative body exercises is determinative and requires standards 
for the exercise of administrative functions.” DANIEL R. MANKELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.02 
(5th ed. 2003). Rezoning cases are a classic example of the confusion courts encounter in trying 
to determine whether a particular municipal decision is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature. 
Jurisdictions are split as to how to characterize rezoning decisions with some states holding that 
they are legislative in nature while others treat them as quasi-judicial actions. Id. at § 6.26. 
Rezoning is hardly the only area of confusion, however. For example, after noting that “[l]egal 
observers concede that the distinction between adjudicative and legislative decisions are not often 
clear,” the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research of the State of California went on to 
describe the convoluted case history of courts reversing themselves in attempting to determine 
whether street abandonments were legislative or adjudicative acts. See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF 
PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF CAL., BRIDGING THE GAP: USING FINDINGS IN LOCAL 
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More importantly, as Justice Alito appears to recognize, many 
formally legislative matters decided by a small town board will 
involve issues that are of particular importance to only a very small 
group of residents.211 In those situations, for the purpose of 
protecting religious minorities and non-religious residents from 
coercion, the individual addressing the board when it acts in its 
legislative capacity is essentially in the same position as an 
individual appearing before the board in an adjudicatory proceeding. 
Indeed, the individual may be in an even worse situation because a 
local board acting in its legislative capacity may often be influenced 
by selfish parochial concerns, special interests, or bias and is rarely 
required to justify its actions under any kind of meaningful 
scrutiny.212 If the resident asking the board to reach a narrow 
legislative decision does not stand and bow his head as requested by 
the prayer-giver, he risks alienating the decision-makers he is trying 
to influence and increases the likelihood of an adverse outcome. As a 
formal matter a legislative proceeding is not an adjudicatory 
proceeding. In small town meetings, however, the coercion inherent 
in the prayer practices of the Town of Greece will be as problematic 
in the former context as the latter. 
5. Distinguishing Graduation Prayer from Legislative Prayer
Justice Kennedy’s final argument for rejecting plaintiffs’
coercion argument involves his attempt to distinguish Lee v. 
LAND USE DECISIONS (2nd ed. 1989), available at http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/Bridging_Gap 
/Gap_3.html#judicial_standards.  
211. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he matters considered
by the board during this initial part of the meeting might involve very specific questions, such as 
the installation of a traffic light or stop sign at a particular intersection . . . .”). Generic legislative 
decisions will often have distinctively severe consequences for specific individuals in the context 
of small town decision-making. For example, if the local police department has seven officers and 
the town board is deciding whether or not to cut the department’s budget so that it will only be 
able to retain six officers, this conventionally “legislative” budget decision will have special 
meaning for the one or two officers who have most recently joined the department. 
212. See, e.g., Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 466−69 (finding that it is not uncommon that the
decisions of local officials are often motivated by parochial views which contravene state law). 
Congress recognized that the operation of the land use regulatory process by local governments 
created an unacceptable risk of religious discrimination when it enacted the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc (2000). Because local 
government actions regarding religious land uses were often highly individualized and subject to 
the almost limitless discretion of local boards and officials, decision-making in these 
circumstances was “particularly susceptible to religious discrimination.” Ashira Pelman Ostrow, 
Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 717, 740−42 (2008). 
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Weisman,213 the case striking down state-sponsored prayer at public 
high school graduations, from Town of Greece.214 Justice Kennedy 
argues that Town of Greece is not governed by the analysis and 
holding of Lee for two reasons. First, he seems to suggest that it is far 
easier for an audience member to leave the room during the prayer 
offered at a town board meeting unnoticed and without disturbing the 
decorum of the event than it is for a graduating student to leave the 
auditorium unnoticed and without creating a disturbance during the 
invocation at her graduation ceremony.215 
There is probably some difference here, but the important 
question is whether it is a difference that matters. As I have argued 
previously, leaving the room during the prayer at a small town board 
meeting is more than noticeable enough to implicate coercion 
concerns. The greater attention that might be directed at a departing 
graduating student may strengthen her Establishment Clause 
challenge, but it does not undermine the arguments of plaintiffs in 
Town of Greece. Moreover, Lee is not the only relevant precedent 
here. The Court also struck down state-sponsored prayers at public 
high school football games in Santa Fe Independent School District 
v. Doe.216 Yet it would be hard to argue that a student leaving the
stands during the prayer offered at a high school football game
would be more noticeable to school authorities and potentially
disruptive of the event than an audience member leaving the board
meeting room during a state-sponsored prayer.
Justice Kennedy’s second argument is even more problematic. 
The plaintiff in Lee was a minor, and as such was particularly 
susceptible to peer pressure and religious indoctrination.217 The 
protection against coercion that the Establishment Clause provides to 
minors, Justice Kennedy explains, cannot be extended to “mature 
adults [such as the plaintiffs in Town of Greece] who ‘presumably’ 
are ‘not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer 
pressure.’”218 
213. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
214. Id.
215. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
216. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
217. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 578.
218. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792
(1983)). 
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There are serious difficulties with this analysis. If we focus on 
the context and setting of the two cases and not on the minority or 
majority status of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs in Town of Greece would 
seem to have a far stronger coercion claim than the plaintiff in Lee. 
Plaintiffs in both cases could argue they were coerced by peer 
pressure. But plaintiffs in Town of Greece have a separate and more 
powerful argument. They are worried that the Town Board will 
decide issues that are important to their lives and property adversely 
to their interests if they do not comply with requests to participate in 
state-sponsored prayers. These are material, not psychological 
consequences, inflicted by the government itself, not by private 
peers. 
The plaintiff in Lee had no such argument. She has just 
graduated from her school. During the school year, because school 
authorities, principal, and teachers have considerable discretionary 
authority over students’ grades and future opportunities, students 
may be justifiably wary of offending them by not participating in a 
school sponsored prayer.219 Indeed, this is one of the reasons courts 
are particularly concerned about the promotion of religion in the 
public schools.220 In this sense, residents attending small town board 
meetings share common concerns with public school students who 
are requested to participate in state-sponsored prayers. Both groups 
must be wary of alienating authorities who have so much 
discretionary power over matters that are important to them. The 
school authorities have no such power over students after they 
graduate, however. Students who refuse to pray at graduation need 
219. Fear of reprisals from teachers and school authorities has always been a concern of
dissenting students and their parents. One of the children involved in the Engel v. Vitale lawsuit, 
for example, describes experiencing “antagonism from the teachers, no question about that.” 
JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 72 (2004); see also DIERENFIELD, supra note 203, at 108 (discussing specific examples 
of students being singled out for their personal or familial religious beliefs). Ellory Schempp, one 
of the Schempp children whose opposition to being forced to recite the Lord’s Prayer and listen to 
Bible verses read over the public address system was vindicated in School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), was subjected to furious scolding from his school 
principal when he refused to participate in mandatory devotions. DIERENFIELD, supra note 203, at 
165. Not content with browbeating the high school student, the principal wrote to the colleges
that Ellory had applied to for admission and urged them to reject his application. Learning that
Tufts University had accepted the Schempp boy into its entering class, the principal tried to
convince the university to rescind his admission. Id. at 168.
220. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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no longer fear how their teachers or principal will evaluate their 
work or reach other decisions of personal importance to them. 
The other problem with Justice Kennedy’s argument has its 
roots in earlier Establishment Clause cases. The Court has suggested 
that we protect minor students in public schools from state-sponsored 
religious activities because they are young and impressionable and 
are “highly susceptible to religious indoctrination.”221 Adults, on the 
other hand, are presumed to have greater knowledge, experience, and 
will power and accordingly, will be able to resist such indoctrination. 
In essence, children in school will believe what their teachers and the 
principal tell them about religion as a matter of course. Adults will 
not be so easily persuaded. 
While there is some truth to this analysis, part of it is grounded 
on an erroneous understanding of what is problematic about religious 
coercion for constitutional purposes. The premise on which this 
conclusion is grounded appears to be that we are primarily concerned 
about state coercion of religious belief and practice because it will 
work. The coerced individual will sacrifice his beliefs and 
conscience to avoid state sanctions. If that result is less likely 
because adults will have the moral fortitude to withstand more 
intense forms of state coercion than children, then there is less reason 
to be concerned about state attempts to influence the religious belief 
and behavior of adults. 
That premise must be wrong, however. Religious coercion is 
constitutionally impermissible whether it is likely to be effective or 
not. It violates our commitment to human dignity and personal 
autonomy to allow the state to pressure religious individuals to 
violate their beliefs and conscience. The ability or willingness of 
certain groups to maintain their religious integrity in the face of 
direct or indirect compulsion should not undermine our conclusion 
that such coercion is constitutionally impermissible. What is 
unacceptable is that individuals are forced to choose between fidelity 
to their faith and conscience or the risk of state sanction. How 
particular individuals respond to that choice is irrelevant to the 
221. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); see also, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (“Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but 
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to 
advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her 
family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.”). 
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constitutionality of the state’s actions. The fact that audience 
members before a town board may decide to risk adverse decisions 
from the board rather than violate their conscience by standing for a 
prayer in their name that misrepresents their beliefs does not justify 
confronting them with these unacceptable alternatives. 
6. Protecting the Religious Autonomy of the Government
Selected Prayer-Giver 
While Justice Kennedy’s opinion demonstrates almost total 
disregard for the religious liberty and conscience of residents who 
attend town board meetings, he offers surprisingly strong protection 
to the conscience of potential prayer-givers who might be invited to 
offer prayers before the same meetings. The juxtaposition of the 
Court’s conclusions here is striking. On the one hand, the Court does 
not require the Town to do much of anything to mitigate the coercion 
of residents who are directed to stand and bow their heads while 
sectarian prayers are offered in their name. On the other hand, the 
Court contends that towns may not take any steps to influence the 
prayer-givers decisions as to the sectarian content they will express 
in their prayers. Justice Kennedy insists, “Once it invites prayer into 
the public sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address 
his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by 
what an administrator or judge considers to be nonsectarian.”222  
As might be expected in an opinion that gets so many other 
things wrong, Justice Kennedy’s analysis here comes pretty close to 
being just plain backwards. Because government involvement with 
religion so commonly threatens religious liberty and religious 
equality, often the safest way to guarantee constitutional values is for 
the state to keep its distance from religion. That, of course, could be 
easily accomplished in the context of this case by a town electing not 
to begin its board meetings with a prayer at all. The Constitution may 
not require the town to make this decision, however. There may be 
constitutionally permissible ways to begin board meetings with a 
prayer.223 The overriding principle, however, must be this. Once the 
222. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822−23.
223. Complex questions may arise in some cases as to whether free speech doctrine or
religion clause doctrine should govern state action involving religious expressive activities. See 
generally Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech 
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J. L. & POL. 119 (2002). It is possible, for example, that the 
government can open up a limited public forum in which both private secular and religious 
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state decides to involve itself with religion and “invites prayer into 
the public sphere,” it is constitutionally required to take appropriate 
steps to protect religious liberty and equality when it does so.224 The 
idea that when the government involves itself with religion, the 
Constitution somehow prevents it from mitigating the resulting 
burdens on religious liberty and equality that result from that 
involvement simply turns church-state doctrine on its head. 
Certainly, there is nothing in the Marsh opinion that supports the 
idea that the legislature lacks the authority to assert any control over 
the prayers offered to begin its sessions. Indeed, the reasoning and 
holding of Marsh is to the contrary. The Court noted in Marsh that 
the chaplain offering prayers before the Nebraska legislature changed 
the content of his prayers and made them more ecumenical when he 
was requested to do so by a Jewish legislator.225 There is no 
suggestion whatsoever that the Constitution prevented the legislature 
as a whole, or a committee supervising the chaplain’s duties, from 
expressing a similar request. 
Indeed, it seems odd at best to suggest that a state legislature 
cannot decline to renew the contract of a chaplain they had hired to 
offer prayers before legislative sessions because they believed the 
prayers offered were unsuitable for a religious diverse institutional 
body and failed to achieve the goals the legislature sought to 
accomplish with its prayer program. Yet, the logic of Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis in Town of Greece would suggest that such 
supervisory oversight of a chaplaincy is unconstitutional. Similarly, 
if Justice Kennedy is correct that the prayers offered at the Town of 
Greece Board meetings were directed at the Board members, not the 
audience, it is hard to understand why the Constitution prohibits the 
Board from telling prayer-givers that they hope to hear prayers that 
speech is expressed. See, e.g., Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 
(1995). No such argument is available in Town of Greece, however. The Town invites specific 
individuals to offer prayers as guest chaplains during a government meeting. It chooses the 
speakers based on their religious affiliation and status. Such arrangements make it clear that the 
prayer practice here constitutes state-sponsored speech, not private speech in a limited public 
forum. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Moreover, even under 
free speech forum analysis, the Town’s practices would be unconstitutional. Religion is a 
viewpoint of speech. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). In 
favoring religious speech, the Town engages in viewpoint discrimination which is 
unconstitutional under long accepted free speech doctrine. See id. 
224. Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra note 126, at 1534–35.
225. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791–95.
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will emphasize the common religious and ethical beliefs that the 
Board members share rather than prayers that emphasize 
denominational differences that may fail to achieve the Board’s 
purpose in requesting that a prayer be offered in the first place. 
7. The Link Between Non-Sectarian Prayer and Coercion
An issue which received little attention from the majority, 
concurring, or dissenting opinions in Town of Greece is whether 
plaintiffs’ argument about the sectarian nature of the prayers and the 
Town’s perceived alignment with Christianity relates in any 
substantive way to plaintiffs’ argument about coercion. The concern 
about the sectarian nature of the prayer and the Town’s affiliation 
with Christianity seems to be primarily grounded in religious 
equality. The claim that residents are coerced into standing and 
participating in the prayer, on the other hand, is more easily 
characterized as a religious liberty issue. 
It is not obvious, for example, how changing the content of the 
prayer or inviting guest chaplains from a broader range of faiths 
mitigates the coercive nature of a town’s prayer practice. While some 
residents may feel more comfortable if a more generic prayer is 
offered, it may be argued that a resident who believes that a generic 
prayer does not reflect his or her beliefs will still feel pressured when 
he or she is asked to stand and join the prayer. Similarly, if a Muslim 
resident of a town attends a board meeting when a sectarian 
Protestant prayer is offered, how does the fact that on one occasion 
every two or three years a Muslim cleric will offer the prayer reduce 
the coercion the Muslim resident experiences to participate in the 
prayer being offered on the day he attends the board meeting? 
While these arguments have considerable force, there is a way 
that a shift from sectarian to generic prayers and to a broader range 
of potential prayer-givers may mitigate the coercion intrinsic to state-
sponsored prayers at small town board meetings—although it will 
not eliminate such coercion entirely. When all the prayer-givers and 
all the prayers are aligned with a particular religion, it will be clear to 
everyone attending a board meeting that the prayer being offered 
reflects the religious beliefs of all, or at least a substantial majority, 
of the members of the board. Accordingly, if a resident leaves the 
room when the prayer is offered, they have every reason to fear that 
their conduct will be construed to be disrespectful to the board 
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members’ own religion. That perception is particularly likely to 
antagonize the very decision-makers that the dissenting resident will 
be trying to influence a short time later. 
Generic prayers, however, are less likely to reflect the faith of 
particular board members. Just as a generic prayer may be less 
objectionable to a broader constituency, the generic prayer is also 
less likely to reflect the denominationally-distinct beliefs or religious 
identity of any member of the board. Thus, a dissenting audience 
member who refuses to participate in the offered prayer is less likely 
to fear that by doing so he will be deemed to be acting 
disrespectfully to the religion adhered to by the board members 
themselves. 
A similar, but somewhat less persuasive, argument applies to 
prayers offered by a more diverse group of guest chaplains. Here, the 
contention would be that the increased diversity of prayer-givers 
distances the individual board members from the substantive content 
of the prayer practice at board meetings. The more that the prayers 
offered are understood to reflect the beliefs of different faith 
traditions, the less likely it is that board members will identify with 
the prayer practice the same way that they would if all the prayers 
reflected the board members’ own beliefs. Increasing the distance 
between the prayer practice in general and the religious identity of 
the board members may ameliorate worries that a failure to 
participate in the prayer would be construed to be a challenge to the 
board members’ faith.226 
V. REMEDIAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY EQUALITY AND LIBERTY
BASED CHALLENGES TO STATE-SPONSORED
PRAYER AT TOWN BOARD MEETINGS 
One of the underlying themes addressed during the oral 
argument in Town of Greece227 and in Justice Alito’s challenge to 
226. While these arguments suggest that a shift from sectarian to more generic prayers may
mitigate coercion to some extent, I consider such a shift to be of secondary utility in reducing 
religious coercion in the context of a small town board meeting. More effective ways to reduce 
coercion would be to use “I” prayers instead of “We” prayers, to have the guest chaplain face the 
board, rather, than the audience if the prayer is to be primarily directed at the board, to offer a 
disclaimer and explanation to make it clear that the board is not aligning itself with particular 
religious beliefs or practices, and to avoid having the chaplain invite audience member to stand, 
bow, their heads, and join in the prayer. 
227. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 31:17–35:17, 38:23–40:17, 42:2–
47:5. 
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Justice Kagan’s dissent228 involves the remedy plaintiffs are seeking 
for the constitutional violations they allege. Are plaintiffs insisting 
that any and all prayers before town board meetings are 
unconstitutional? If not, what are the feasible, constitutionally 
permissible constraints they would impose on town board 
prayer-practices to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the burdens on 
religious liberty and equality on which they base their claims? 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion focuses on plaintiffs’ argument that 
the Establishment Clause prohibits state-sponsored sectarian prayers 
at town board meetings.229 Justice Kennedy defends such prayers as 
a substantive matter because he contends they are consistent with our 
historical traditions230 and the government has no business telling 
clergy what is acceptable content of the prayers they may express—
even when the prayers are offered at the government’s request at 
government functions.231 But the Court also expressed concerns 
about the feasibility of a requirement prohibiting sectarian prayer. 
How is a town board or a reviewing judge to determine whether the 
terminology of a prayer is sufficiently generic to satisfy 
constitutional standards? Whatever words are expressed in a prayer, 
it is likely that some individuals or groups may claim, with some 
justification, that the prayer is not sufficiently inclusive to reflect 
their beliefs.232 
Plaintiffs had a forceful response to this argument. While it is 
easy to conjure up hypothetical problems with the requirement of 
inclusive, non-sectarian prayers, in fact such standards are commonly 
applied, without any obvious difficulty, throughout the United 
States.233 The House of Representatives, many state legislatures, and 
all the cities, counties, and state legislatures within the Fourth Circuit 
operate under such a system.234 In the real world, the problems the 
Court envisions simply have not occurred. 
228. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
229. See id. at 1820–24 (majority opinion).
230. See id. at 1824 (“The prayers delivered in the town of Greece do not fall outside the
tradition this Court has recognized.”). 
231. See id. at 1822–23.
232. See id. at 1822.
233. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 50–52; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 152, at 34:10–35:1, 46:19–46:25, 50:16–50:23. 
234. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1845–46 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondents, supra note 3, at 50–52. 
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Notwithstanding this rejoinder, the Court’s concerns here cannot 
be totally discounted. Indeed, the broader and more inclusive prayers 
may be, in response to a town’s request, the more painful the 
experience may be for those few individuals or groups who continue 
to feel excluded from its coverage.235 A court committed to 
protecting religious liberty and equality might still balk at a 
constitutional requirement prohibiting the offering of sectarian 
prayers at town board meetings. 
Short of prohibiting non-sectarian prayers, are there other 
remedial constraints the Court could have imposed on the offering of 
state-sponsored prayers to protect the religious liberty and equality 
rights of residents attending town board meetings? The answer to this 
question is obviously an affirmative one, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Court ignored many of these possibilities and summarily 
rejected the others. If one examines the opinions of the dissenting 
Justices, Judge Calabresi’s opinion for the Second Circuit, and the 
plaintiffs’ arguments in their brief and oral argument, it is clear that 
numerous aspects of the Town’s prayer practice were identified as 
problematic and that changes to those practices would make the 
prayer practice more consistent with constitutional values. 
As discussed previously, the Town’s imprecise and limited 
process by which guest chaplains were invited to offer prayers at 
meetings was criticized as discriminatory in effect and contributing 
to the religious homogeneity of both the clergy invited to Board 
meetings and the content of the prayers they offered.236 The solution 
to these defects could be easily accomplished. A town deciding to 
sponsor prayers at board meetings should be required to adopt a 
selection policy that is written down and supervised. Neither ad hoc 
decisions by unsupervised petty functionaries nor unwritten 
invitation policies never communicated to the public are acceptable. 
Residents who are members of minority faiths with too few 
adherents to create a local congregation and who attend houses of 
worship outside of the town’s borders must be treated as if they exist 
and deserve the same respect as residents who are members of 
 in-town congregations. The same principle applies to residents who 
235. See Alan Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue: A Discussion of Justice
Stevens’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 605, 648–
51 (2012). 
236. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
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are spiritual but are not affiliated with any organized religion and 
residents who are not religious.237 The policy must require serious 
efforts to assure that all congregations and all residents located in the 
community are recognized. 
Justice Kennedy never explains why a broader, more rule-
governed, and more transparent selection process for inviting prayer-
givers is not required. Justice Alito’s suggestion that a policy more 
protective of religious equality is beyond the ability of small towns238 
is hard to take seriously. As Justice Breyer explained in his dissent, 
in addition to engaging in a greater effort to communicate with 
houses of worship in neighboring communities, and announcing the 
open opportunity to serve as guest chaplain at the beginning of Board 
meetings, the Town easily could “have posted its policy of 
permitting anyone to give an invocation on its website . . . which 
provides dates and times of upcoming town board meetings.”239 
Instead, the Town did nothing to achieve even the semblance of 
religious equality in its selection procedures.240 For the majority of 
the Court, nothing was good enough. 
Equality concerns could also be mitigated if a town provided 
guidance to the prayer-givers as to the purpose of the prayer and the 
kinds of prayers that are inconsistent with that purpose and would 
raise constitutional concerns. While the Court sees no constitutional 
problem with highly sectarian prayers, it explains that legislative 
prayers that fall within our constitutional tradition are designed to 
elevate the proceedings and invite lawmakers to “reflect upon shared 
ideals and common ends.”241 Prayers that “denigrate nonbelievers or 
religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion,” 
serve other purposes and are constitutionally suspect.242 Yet the 
Court does not require town boards to inform the clergy they invite 
of these constitutional parameters. Instead, it holds that plaintiffs can 
only challenge a course or practice of inappropriate prayers. This is 
237. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 31 (explaining that with regard to the Town’s failure to invite
individuals who are not affiliated with religious institutions to offer prayers, “[t]he town is not a 
community of religious institutions, but of individual residents, and, at the least, it must serve 
those residents without favor or disfavor to any creed or belief”). 
238. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 1823 (majority opinion).
242. Id.
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not only an extraordinarily difficult burden to meet, but in the 
ordinary course of events it will do nothing to protect minorities 
from disparaging or proselytizing prayers. 
A brief statement by a board to the audience before a prayer is 
expressed could also mitigate equality concerns. The board could 
explain the solemnizing function of the state-sponsored prayers, 
clarify that the board understands and respects the diversity of beliefs 
in the community, and assure everyone that the choice of guest 
chaplain and the content of the offered prayer does not reflect the 
board’s endorsement of a particular faith or belief.243 The Court 
required no such explanation or disclaimer. 
The guest chaplain should also be advised that the prayer should 
be offered in his name, not in the name of the audience in 
attendance.244 Government has no vested authority to speak to G-d in 
the name of its citizens.245 Moreover, concerns about the sectarian 
terminology of prayers are sharply reduced when it is clear the 
prayer reflects the beliefs of the chaplain offering the prayer and not 
the beliefs of people of other faiths or no faith in the audience. This 
admonition to prospective guest chaplains would not require the 
parsing of prayers or an evaluation of the inclusivity or exclusivity of 
specific language. In most cases, it would simply require the chaplain 
to offer an “I” prayer as opposed to a “we” prayer.246 
Further, the board could explain before the prayer is offered that 
it understands that in a religious diverse community, there is no one 
size fits all prayer and the audience cannot and should not be 
expected to stand and participate in prayers of other faiths. It should 
be emphasized that no such conduct is expected or required of the 
audience.247 If the prayer is actually to be directed at the board and 
not the audience, as Justice Kennedy insists it is,248 the board should 
make that clear to the audience as well. The guest chaplain should 
face the board members if they are the intended beneficiaries of the 
prayer. 
243. See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 1850–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Galloway, 681
F.3d at 32–33.
244. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1848 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting); Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32. 
245. Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra note 126, at 1529.
246. Id. at 1536.
247. Id.
248. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825–26.
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All of these steps are easily accomplished. None seriously 
interfere with the guest chaplain’s ability to pray in a way that is 
meaningful to him or her. Taken together, they substantially reduce 
the religious liberty and equality costs of offering a state-sponsored 
prayer at the beginning of a town board meeting. The Court did not 
require town boards to take any of these steps. 
VI. THE DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF TOWN OF GREECE 
A. The Parameters of Prayer Practices at Town Board Meetings
1. Who Must be Invited to Offer Prayers?
What Town of Greece means for future Establishment Clause 
cases is not easy to decipher. The first and somewhat less difficult 
question is what this decision says about the constitutionality of 
prayers offered at town board or city council meetings. These prayers 
are now presumptively constitutional to the extent that they model 
the practices upheld in Town of Greece. Serious questions remain, 
however, as to exactly what that model entails and when a prayer 
practice unconstitutionally departs from it. 
An initial question is what constitutes a constitutionally 
acceptable invitation policy to individuals asked to offer prayers? 
Although it runs counter to every constitutional intuition in any other 
area of constitutional law in which salient values and concerns about 
bias and discrimination are recognized, it would seem that a town 
can escape serious Establishment Clause scrutiny by assigning the 
job of inviting individuals to offer prayers to some petty functionary 
and provide him little guidance as to how to proceed in arranging 
prayers to be offered each month. A clerk could invite all organized 
congregations reflecting majoritarian beliefs, “inadvertently” ignore 
the one or two religious minority congregations in the community for 
at least ten years, and pay no attention whatsoever to nonaffiliated 
residents, nonreligious individuals, or adherents of minority faiths 
who worship in congregations outside of town. That is the model the 
Court upheld in Town of Greece. It is in my view an entirely 
unjustified and unsympathetic model, but it is what the Court has 
upheld. What happens, however, if a town deviates from this model? 
If a town adopts a formal policy for inviting individuals to offer 
prayers, it might be more constrained in its options. While the Court 
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clearly accepts discrimination in favor of organized religious 
congregations and against less established faiths in compiling the 
invitation list, discrimination among organized congregations is more 
problematic. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion suggests that an 
intentional decision to exclude the few minority religious 
congregations within the town’s borders would be unconstitutional. 
Indeed, Justice Alito states that a deliberate decision to exclude 
synagogues in neighboring communities—at which Jewish town 
residents worshipped—from the list of potential guest chaplains 
would create a very different case than the one before him.249 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion would not go that far. He explicitly 
rejects the idea that the town is required “to search beyond its 
borders” for prayer-givers of minority faiths.250 Moreover, it is not 
even clear that Justice Kennedy would strike down a policy that 
deliberately excluded local minority congregations from the list of 
potential guest chaplains as long as adherents of these minority faiths 
would be considered as potential prayer-givers on a 
non-discriminatory basis if they asked for the opportunity to offer a 
prayer. Much of the language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion implies 
that a willingness to allow anyone who is not on the list of eligible 
prayer-givers to offer a prayer if they request the chance to do so 
cures any lack of inclusivity in the list of invited guest chaplains.251 
Two additional problems remain unresolved. First, what if the 
town did not invite clergy from all or almost all of its congregations 
to serve as prayer-givers, but instead only invited a minister from one 
house of worship or clergy from two or three denominations? Would 
that be unconstitutional? As noted earlier, the Marsh decision, on 
which Town of Greece purports to be based, involved a legislative 
chaplain from one Protestant denomination who had served in that 
post for eighteen years. Yet the Court in Marsh saw no constitutional 
vulnerability in that policy. Thus, the Court’s call for a policy of 
non-discrimination in Town of Greece seems inconsistent with 
Marsh. This leaves open the question of whether Town of Greece 
modifies the holding in Marsh to require legislative prayer-givers to 
249. Id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 1824 (majority opinion).
251. See, e.g., id. at 1816 (“The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a
would-be prayer giver. Its leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any persuasion, 
including an atheist, could give the invocation.”).  
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be selected on an inclusive, non-discriminatory basis or whether 
there are now two constitutional models for legislative prayer—
either of which would satisfy constitutional requirements. A town 
could invite a range of prayer-givers from various denominations, in 
which case it must abide by a policy of non-discrimination among 
faiths, or it can select one or a small number of “chaplains” to offer 
prayers, in which case it can favor one or a select few faiths.252 
Second, what must a town do to respond to requests by 
uninvited clergy and lay persons to be included on the list of 
potential guest chaplains? The town can discriminate initially in 
favor of clergy from organized congregations in creating the list of 
prayer-givers. Can it also assign some priority to organized 
congregations or clergy from such institutions in deciding which 
guest chaplains to invite first? Are persons who request the 
opportunity to be a prayer-giver placed at the bottom of the list 
behind the names of clergy from local congregations the town has 
already identified as possible guest chaplains? The Town of Greece 
opinion gives little guidance on these issues. 
These concerns may become increasingly important depending 
on the possible political consequences of Town of Greece. The 
Court’s approval of legislative prayer may encourage some 
communities where prayers have not been offered in the past, to 
institute this practice. Also, dissenters from these prayer practices 
who object to the alignment of their government with religion or a 
particular faith may now believe that litigation to challenge the 
prayers is futile. Accordingly, the only way to provide some 
recognition of the diversity of belief within a community will be for 
adherents of minority faiths and non-religious individuals to request 
the opportunity to offer invocations at board meetings. It remains to 
be seen how those individuals will be treated in light of the reasoning 
and holding of Town of Greece. 
252. Lupu and Tuttle suggest that other alternatives may be available. It is not clear for
example that it would be unconstitutional if the board members chose to “rotate the prayer 
opportunity among themselves.” IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, 
RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 265 (2014). 
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2. What Constitutional Constraints Apply to the Structure
 and Content of Legislative  Prayer? 
Notwithstanding the Court’s general affirmation of the 
constitutionality of legislative prayers before town board meetings, 
the scope and nature of legislative prayer is not unlimited. It is at 
least arguable that the Court may recognize certain time constraints 
as to when prayers may be offered. As noted, Justice Kennedy did 
point out that the prayers in the Town of Greece Board meetings 
were offered during the “ceremonial portion of the town’s meeting” 
at a time when board members were “not engaged in policy 
making.”253 Justice Alito is even more specific in explaining the case 
does not “involve the constitutionality of a prayer prior to what may 
be characterized as an adjudicatory proceeding,” and only evaluates 
prayer before the legislative part of the Board meeting.254 Thus, there 
remains an open question as to whether government-sponsored 
prayers can be offered immediately before a town board engages in 
non-legislative, administrative or adjudicatory actions. 
Justice Kennedy also notes that an invocation involving a 
“lengthy disquisition on religious dogma” may exceed the 
parameters of the tradition of legislative prayer approved of in 
Marsh.255Apparently at some point the legislative prayer may go on 
for such a long time that it constitutes a state-sponsored religious 
service. As such, it would arguably unconstitutionally promote 
religion and burden dissenters. How long is too long, of course, is 
anybody’s guess. But there is some implicit sense in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion that what the Court is upholding must be 
cognizable as a ceremonial prayer and not some other kind of 
religious exercise or form of worship. 
There may be some manner constraints on prayers as well. The 
Court affirms that prayer-givers may ask the audience to stand and 
bow their heads and join in the offered prayer. It is unclear whether 
there are any limits to such requests. May a prayer-giver ask the 
audience to kneel while the prayer is offered? Alternatively, may he 
253. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1815, 1827.
254. Id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 1826–27.
432 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:371 
or she ask the audience to raise their hands if they believe in the 
efficacy of prayer or the divinity of Jesus Christ?256 
The Court says much more about the content of permissible 
prayers. After Town of Greece, it is abundantly clear that legislative 
prayer may be sectarian. It may express its message to G-d in 
explicitly denominational terms that reflect the beliefs and doctrine 
of particular faiths. Indeed, according to the Court, it would violate 
the Constitution for the town board to attempt to require the 
prayer-giver to express his message in more ecumenical terms.257 
Some constraints on the content of prayers are recognized, 
however. The limits fall into two categories. On the one hand, there 
is a constraint on the extent to which the prayer can disparage others. 
Justice Kennedy says repeatedly that to be constitutionally 
acceptable and serve their ceremonial function, legislative prayers 
may not “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities” or “threaten 
[them with] damnation.”258 Such prayers may not denigrate others or 
betray an impermissible government purpose.259 They cannot 
“‘disparage any other, faith or belief’”260 or “chastise dissenters.”261 
On the other hand, there is also a limit on the extent to which 
legislative prayers may promote religion or a particular faith. 
Legislative prayers may not “preach conversion.”262 They may not 
“proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief.”263 
The Court also emphasizes, however, that a single instance of 
proselytizing or disparaging messages is of no constitutional 
significance. There must be a “course and practice [of transgressions] 
over time.”264 Only evidence of “the pattern of prayers over time” 
can support an Establishment Clause claim.265 The focus must be on 
256. During oral argument, plaintiffs’ attorney, Professor Laycock, argued that just such a
prayer would be permissible if the Court held that the government could not control the content 
and nature of prayers offered by invited clergy. See Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra 
note 126, at 1535–36. Justice Scalia responded repeatedly to this example by insisting: “That’s 
not a prayer.” Id. 
257. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822–23.
258. Id. at 1823.
259. See id. at 1824.
260. Id. at 1823 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)).
261. Id. at 1826.
262. Id. at 1823.
263. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
264. Id.
265. See id. at 1826–27.
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“the prayer opportunity as a whole, rather than [on] the contents of a 
single prayer.”266 
A meaningful prohibition against proselytizing or the 
disparaging of other faiths or nonreligious individuals would raise 
serious questions about how these impermissible prayers could be 
identified. There is little reason to think that the Court is interested in 
a nuanced analysis of these concerns, however. Many of the prayers 
at issue in Town of Greece proclaimed the truth and extolled the 
virtue of Christian beliefs. There is no indication that the plurality 
and concurring justices viewed any of these prayers as proselytizing. 
It appears that to constitute proselytizing a prayer must explicitly 
urge conversion in no uncertain terms. The line may be tighter 
regarding disparaging messages. But here, of course, the Court 
rejects the central thrust of plaintiffs’ arguments in this case. What is 
disparaging about the prayer practice of the Town of Greece is that 
for a decade the selection of prayer-givers and the prayers they 
expressed treated adherents of minority faiths, the spiritually 
unaffiliated, and non-religious residents as if they did not exist or did 
not deserve recognition for their beliefs. That message of 
disparagement is constitutionally acceptable to the current Court.267 
While there may not be much to these substantive constraints, 
one may certainly imagine a community far more sensitive to 
religious liberty and equality concerns than the Town of Greece (or 
the Court) that tries to take them seriously. What exactly may such a 
community do to enforce these standards? One would presume that it 
could inform individuals selected to offer prayers that they cannot 
proselytize or disparage nonbelievers. A harder question is whether 
they can criticize a prayer-giver who violates these standards and 
refuse to invite him back unless he conforms his prayer to 
constitutional requirements. There may be legal vulnerability here if 
the town believes the “chaplain” has engaged in proselytizing or 
disparaging prayer and a reviewing court disagrees with that 
assessment. Town of Greece suggests that once the town invites an 
individual to offer a prayer before a town board meeting, the 
Constitution protects the right of that individual to offer any prayer 
he chooses without regard to its sectarian nature. The line between 
266. Id. at 1824.
267. See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
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the impermissible proselytizing of one faith (or the disparagement of 
another) and permissible sectarian prayer may be extremely thin and 
depend on the eye of the beholder. 
Alternatively, some communities may see little harm in 
proselytizing prayers or prayers that disparage nonbelievers. If an 
individual invited to offer a prayer engages in proselytizing or 
denigrates religious minorities, does the town have any obligation to 
respond to his remarks or to deny him an opportunity to offers 
prayers at the town board meeting in the future? As long as most 
“guest chaplains” offer prayers consistent with the constitutional 
standards governing legislative prayer, it is uncertain whether a 
town’s tolerance of a “chaplain” who repeatedly violates these 
standards constitutes the kind of pattern that violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
B. The Application of Town of Greece to the Adjudication
of Establishment Clause Claims Against  State-Sponsored
 Religious Messages in Other Settings 
Supporters of a meaningful constitutional commitment to 
religious liberty and religious equality can only hope that the 
reasoning and holding of Town of Greece is limited to legislative 
prayer. There is some language that supports a narrow reading of the 
case in Justice Kennedy’s opinion,268 but other language suggests 
that the opinion is not limited to the context of legislative prayer.269 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is more explicit. As noted, he 
argues that the Town of Greece decision extends only to legislative 
meetings and not adjudicatory proceedings. More emphatically, at 
the conclusion of his concurrence he challenges the hypotheticals 
Justice Kagan presented in her dissent and their implication that 
268. Part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the historical tradition supporting
legislative prayer and that this tradition “has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political 
change.” Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819. This at least suggests that his opinion is limited to 
government-sponsored prayers or religious displays with a strong pedigree that has continued to 
the current time. 
269. Other language in Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems far more expansive. His contention
that government is disabled from controlling the content of state-sponsored prayer “once it invites 
prayer into the public sphere” could apply outside of the context of legislative prayer. See, e.g., 
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822–23. More problematically, Justice Kennedy’s dismissal of 
plaintiffs’ coercion claims because plaintiffs did not allege specific threats of sanctions and 
because no one would notice or care if plaintiffs walked out when a state-sponsored prayer was 
offered seems based on an understanding of social reality that extends beyond the legislature’s 
chambers. See id. at 1826–27. 
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citizens could be asked by government officials to join in prayer in a 
variety of settings. “Nothing could be further from the truth,” Justice 
Alito insists.270 “All that the Court does today is to allow a town to 
follow a practice that we have previously held is permissible for 
Congress and state legislatures.”271 
If the reasoning and holding of Town of Greece is determined to 
be broadly applicable, the liberty and equality interests of religious 
minorities and non-religious people would be substantially 
diminished. Consider first the implications of Town of Greece for 
religious equality. First, previous doctrinal constraints on religious 
displays and state-sponsored prayers no longer apply. The 
endorsement test, championed by Justice O’Connor, has no place in 
the Court’s opinion.272 Nor is the Court constrained by Justice 
Scalia’s repeated suggestion that government cannot sponsor 
messages on which monotheistic believers in a personal G-d would 
disagree.273 
Second, with regard to government invitations to private 
individuals and organizations to express state-sponsored religious 
messages on public property, government would be permitted to 
discriminate in favor of organized congregations and entirely ignore 
religious minorities with too few adherents in the community to 
support a congregation. It could ignore the beliefs and messages of 
nonaffiliated residents and nonreligious individuals as well. The only 
limit to this discrimination is that the government must include (to 
some undetermined extent) the messages of religious minorities and 
nonreligious residents who ask to participate in its expressive 
program. Under this analysis, for example, it would seem that the 
government could invite all the religious congregations in the 
community to display religious murals on the walls of government 
buildings and place religious icons in the lobby of every government 
office building. As long as the government would accept requests 
from minorities and nonreligious residents to participate in the 
program, again to some indeterminate extent, the Establishment 
Clause would not be violated. 
270. Id. at 1834 (Alito, J., concurring).
271. Id.
272. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 252, at 263.
273. See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
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The cumulative effect of the religious messages of majority 
faiths pervading public property in the community would be 
irrelevant to the constitutional analysis, just as the cumulative effect 
of a decade of sectarian Christian prayers before town board 
meetings was irrelevant to the Court’s analysis in Town of Greece. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, presumably the town board in a 
predominately Christian community could invite all the local 
churches to erect a large billboard at the entrance to the town, 
proclaiming that this is a Christian community, quoting a sectarian 
prayer, and listing the Christian congregations in the town—as long 
as there was a note at the bottom of the sign indicating that some 
non-Christians and non-religious people live here too. 
Third, state-sponsored prayers and religious displays could 
explicitly extoll the beliefs and commitments of majoritarian faiths. 
The prayers and displays could not involve a pattern and practice of 
preaching conversion or disparaging minorities and nonbelievers. 
However, individual instances of state-sponsored proselytizing or the 
denigration of minorities would have no constitutional significance. 
A commitment to religious equality requires government to treat 
people of all faiths and those who are not religious as if they are of 
equal worth and deserving of equal respect. Under Town of Greece, 
government may treat religious minorities as if they barely exist and 
certainly do not count as respected members of the community. If 
Town of Greece is interpreted expansively, religious equality would 
mean as little in the public life of largely, religiously homogeneous 
communities throughout the United States as it does in the town 
board chambers of the Town of Greece. 
The implications of an expansive reading of Town of Greece for 
religious liberty are equally if not more disastrous. As noted 
previously, the line between Justices Thomas’s and Scalia’s 
contention that the only coercion that counts for Establishment 
Clause purposes is that which is imposed “by force of law and threat 
of penalty” and Justice Kennedy’s position is perilously thin.274 
Justice Kennedy’s insistence that to demonstrate coercion plaintiffs 
must prove that decision-makers took plaintiffs refusal to participate 
in prayers into account in denying them benefits (or otherwise ruling 
against their interests) or indicated in some way that they intended to 
274. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.
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do so in essence requires a “threat of penalty” before coercion would 
be recognized. Without such concrete evidence of sanctions, Justice 
Kennedy rejects the idea that coercion is implicit in a setting in 
which petitioners are asked to pray by clergy invited to offer prayers 
by the very decision-makers the petitioners are attempting to 
influence and on whose discretionary judgments they are 
dependent.275 
Under the accepted premises and reasoning of Town of Greece, 
a government official, bureaucrat, or legislative, administrative, or 
adjudicatory body charged with exercising discretionary authority to 
decide issues of great importance to applicants or petitioners can 
invite clergy to offer a prayer at the beginning of a scheduled 
appointment or proceeding. Applicants or petitioners can be asked to 
stand, bow their heads, and join in the sectarian prayer offered by the 
guest chaplain who prays in their name. The applicant or petitioner 
should understand that their refusal to stand or participate in the 
prayer will not be noticed by decision-makers or taken into account 
in their deliberations. Also, they should recognize that by standing 
and bowing their heads, their conduct will not be understood as 
acquiescing in the prayer nor can it be reasonably experienced as 
participating in a religious exercise. Thus, no unconstitutional 
coercion of religious exercise exists in such situations. 
In the real world, of course, such situations can only reasonably 
be understood as intrinsically coercive. To refuse to recognize their 
coercive nature demonstrates either an extraordinary 
misunderstanding of social reality or an extraordinary lack of 
concern for religious liberty. Religious liberty receives no support in 
either case. 
Justice Alito appears to recognize that these kinds of state 
sponsored prayer practices are constitutionally unacceptable. At least 
that seems to be why he so emphatically rejects the implications of 
Justice Kagan’s dissent that “this is where today’s decision leads”—
to the upholding of intrinsically coercive, divisive prayer practices in 
a range of governmental settings.276 But Justice Alito never explains 
why he believes the burdens on religious liberty and equality which 
he ostensibly deems to be constitutionally unacceptable in Justice 
275. See id.
276. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1834 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Kagan’s hypotheticals are not equally present in the context of 
state-sponsored prayers at town board meetings. Justice Alito, after 
all, joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court and that opinion 
rejects the idea that the Town of Greece’s prayer practices burden 
religious liberty or equality in any constitutionally meaningful way. 
Without some coherent explanation as to why his concern about 
coercion and religious inequality in Justice Kagan’s hypotheticals 
does not carry over to the adjudication of challenges to town board 
prayer practices, Justice Alito’s protests that this is not where the 
Court or the country is going provides little solace or assurance to 
those of us who care about religious liberty and equality as 
constitutional values. 
